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CROSSED WIRES: ENDORSEMENT SIGNALS AND THE EFFECTS OF IPO FIRM 
DELISTINGS ON VENTURE CAPITALISTS’ REPUTATIONS  
 
Signaling theorists have paid a great deal of attention to the costs of acquiring characteristics that 
can serve as signals, such as endorsements from reputable third parties. However limited 
attention has been devoted to the penalty costs associated with providing inaccurate signals and 
the factors that can exacerbate or attenuate the penalties. We examine the effect of negative 
feedback loops on venture capital firms’ reputations that result from the failures (delistings) of 
the newly-public firms they once endorsed. Drawing on signaling and attribution theories, we 
argue that endorsements by reputable VC firms create high expectations that when violated cause 
stakeholders to look for scapegoats, resulting in reputational damage to the endorsing VCs. We 
find empirical support for this argument, and for the attenuating effect of both post-IPO market 
performance and survival. Our study contributes to the conversation about endorsements as 
signals, and empirically tests the implicit assumption that endorsements place the reputation of 
the endorser at risk.  
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How do you decide whether to try a new restaurant, see a new doctor, or stay at a new 
hotel? Odds are that you look for different clues, or signals, that you are likely to have a good 
experience—chief among them is the organization’s or individual’s reputation. Defined as an 
intangible asset based on broad public recognition of the quality of a firm’s activities and outputs 
(Rindova, Williamson, Petkova, & Sever, 2005), a firm’s reputation is critical to its success and 
forms the basis for observers’ expectations about its ability to create future value (Fischer & 
Reuber, 2007; Fombrun, 2001; Lange, Lee, & Dai, 2011; Lee, Pollock & Jin, 2011). New 
organizations, however, often lack the reputations necessary to help them survive, contributing to 
their “liabilities of newness” (Stinchcombe, 1965).  
When information on an organization’s reputation is unavailable, we often turn to the 
reputations of the firm’s affiliates as signals of its likely quality and capabilities (Lee et al., 2011; 
Petkova, 2012; Rindova, Williamson, Petkova, & Sever, 2005). For example, when deciding 
whether to invest in or do business with new firms, affiliations with prominent and reputable 
third parties such as venture capital (VC) firms, investment banks, and alliance partners are 
treated as valuable signals (e.g., Lee & Wahal, 2004; Pollock, Chen, Jackson & Hambrick, 2010; 
Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999). Signaling theory argues that signals are valuable because they 
are costly to the signalers (Spence, 1973); in the case of endorsements, the assumed cost is that 
the endorsers’ reputations will be damaged if the firms they endorse perform poorly. That is, by 
putting their own reputations at risk, endorsers signal the endorsed firms’ quality and potential.  
The endorsing firm’s involvement also suggests that the new firm has access to the 
endorser’s capital, skills and expertise, networks, and other resources that can enhance its 
probability of future success (e.g., Gorman & Sahlman, 1989; Jain & Kini, 2000; Pollock & 
Gulati, 2007). Studies have shown that startups often enjoy favorable market valuations and 
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superior firm performance after receiving endorsements from prestigious VC firms (Lee et al., 
2011; Pollock et al., 2010), underwriters (Gulati & Higgins, 2003; Sanders & Boivie, 2004), top 
executives (Higgins & Gulati, 2006; Pollock et al., 2010), and directors (Daily & Dalton, 2001; 
Deutsch & Ross, 2003). As a result, new organizations often pay substantial premiums to garner 
these endorsements (Chen, Hambrick, & Pollock, 2008; Hsu, 2004).  
But what happens when these endorsements prove to be unreliable signals and the new 
firm fails to meet stakeholders’ expectations? If your experience with the new restaurant, doctor 
or hotel is bad, does that influence the way you view the person who recommended them to you, 
and whether you will be as willing to accept their endorsement in the future? And what 
contextual factors influence the extent to which you blame them for your experience? In other 
words, is the endorser’s reputation really “at risk,” and damaged if the firm they endorsed 
performs unsatisfactorily? And what influences the extent of the damage?  
Connelly and colleagues (2011: 61) noted that, “the management literature is mainly 
focused on signal costs, containing less discussion of the role of penalty costs, which are a form 
of negative feedback from the receiver” (Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2011). They 
further noted that “The signaling environment on the whole is an under-researched aspect of 
signaling theory” (2011: 62). Indeed, a plethora of studies have shown that new firms benefit 
from prominent affiliations (e.g., Carter & Manaster, 1990; Petkova, 2012; Pollock et al. , 2010; 
Stuart et al., 1999), and that negative events (Ahrens, 2010; Mishina, Block, & Mannor, 2012; 
Pfarrer, Decelles, Smith, & Taylor, 2008; Rhee & Haunschild, 2006) or tainted endorsers 
(Shymko & Roulet, 2017) adversely affect a focal firm’s reputation. However, these studies only 
examine the effects of endorsements on the endorsed firm, rather than following the feedback 
loop back to examine what happens to the endorsers if the signal turns out to be incorrect.  
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In this study we draw on signaling theory (e.g. Connelly et al., 2011; Spence, 1973) and 
attribution theory (Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1973; Weiner, 1986) to test this critical assumption and 
consider the degree to which endorsers actually put their reputations at risk when endorsing other 
firms. We also explore the factors that can enhance or attenuate the damage experienced. We 
specifically examine instances where newly-public firms are delisted from their stock exchange 
for reasons other than being acquired by another firm (e.g., regulatory violations, poor financial 
performance, or failing to meet their exchange’s minimum listing requirements), and whether the 
VCs who funded them suffer a reputational penalty. Finally, we consider how the success of the 
firm’s IPO, its post-IPO performance, and the time between the IPO and its delisting affect the 
magnitude of the penalty.  
While successful IPOs are visible, reputation-enhancing events for the VCs who funded 
them (Lee & Wahal, 2004; Pollock, Lee, Jin & Lashley, 2015), whether the VCs’ reputations are 
actually damaged if the firms are subsequently delisted is unclear. The process of going public 
involves scrutiny from the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) as part of the registration 
process, and from potential investors during “road shows” prior to the IPO (Husick & Arrington, 
1998). Thus, firms that go public receive the approval of many stakeholders, not just VCs (Certo, 
2003). Furthermore, a public listing is often the start of a new chapter in the firm’s life that is 
decoupled from its VC backers. In fact, the VC’s job is largely viewed as complete at the time of 
the IPO (Pollock et al., 2010), an event that is treated as a successful “exit” or “liquidity event” 
for VCs (Gorman & Sahlman, 1989; Loughran & Ritter, 1995).  
This setting is ideal for exploring the reputational penalties from providing signals later 
perceived as inaccurate because VCs rely heavily on their reputations to raise investment funds 
and gain access to promising startups (Lee et al., 2011; Pollock et al., 2015), and the startups 
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they fund benefit greatly from the signaling value these affiliations provide (Gulati & Higgins, 
2003; Lee et al., 2011). VCs tout the successful firms they have funded when marketing 
themselves to investors and startups (Fund, Pollock, Baker & Wowak, 2008), and studies have 
shown that younger VCs may even “grandstand” —that is, take a firm public earlier than it 
should, leaving more money on the table to establish a favorable reputation with investors 
(Gompers, 1996; Lee & Wahal, 2004). However, few if any studies have examined the 
consequences for VCs when the firms they take public fail to live up to the expectations their 
endorsements created. 
Our study makes several contributions. First, we contribute to the signaling literature by 
theorizing about the negative feedback loop from a signal’s receivers to the sender, and testing 
whether there is a penalty or cost to sending inaccurate signals (Connelly et al., 2011). We 
advance our understanding of signaling dynamics and the signaling value of endorsements by 
developing a more nuanced understanding of how this negative feedback loop works, and by 
examining the factors that can influence the strength of the feedback loop and size of the 
reputation penalty. These effects occur even when endorsers have little or no direct influence 
over the other firm’s actions, and vary depending on the post-IPO performance of the endorsed 
firm. Furthermore, we also find evidence that when a firm has multiple endorsers, not all of them 
bear the same reputational risk. Finally, we contribute to the entrepreneurship literature by 
empirically showing that there may be long-term reputational costs for VCs if their actions 
increase the short-term value of portfolio firms at the expense of their future viability.  
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
All new firms face the fundamental challenge of reducing the information asymmetries 
that exist between the firm and key stakeholders with whom it wants to engage (Carter & 
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Manaster, 1990; Higgins & Gulati, 2003; Petkova, 2012; Pollock et al., 2010; Pollock & Gulati, 
2007; Stuart et al., 1999). As such, new, young firms search for opportunities to provide signals 
that can reduce these information asymmetries. Spence (1973) argued that characteristics which 
are visible and costly to acquire can be used to signal an actor’s unobservable quality to others, 
and thereby reduce information asymmetries. One such signal is affiliations with, or 
endorsements by reputable actors (Petkova, 2012). Endorsements from established and reputable 
organizations signal that the new organizations may have the qualities needed to succeed in the 
future (Carter & Manaster, 1990; Lee et al., 2011; Stuart et al., 1999). These affiliations are 
visible to others because of the endorser’s prominence, and are valuable because they enable new 
firms to “borrow” (Petkova, 2012: 384) some of their endorser’s reputation. They are also costly 
because reputable actors are presumably putting their reputational capital at risk in a visible way 
by endorsing the new firm (Pollock, 2004). The new firm’s failure to perform should reflect 
poorly on the endorser and damage its reputation to some degree.  
For young ventures whose legitimacy and futures are uncertain (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; 
Stinchcombe, 1965), being affiliated with prominent and reputable third parties such as VC 
firms, investment banks, and alliance partners can make an important difference in their success 
and life chances (e.g., Lee & Wahal, 2004; Petkova, 2012; Pollock, et al., 2010; Stuart et al., 
1999). Indeed, given that less than one percent of new companies receive VC financing in a 
given year (Rao, 2013), and that only a fraction of those are funded by the highest-reputation 
VCs (Lee et al., 2011), endorsement by a VC provides a powerful signal to potential stakeholders 
such as investors (Pollock et al., 2010), customers (Reuber & Fischer, 2005) and alliance 
partners (Pollock & Gulati, 2007). Such reputation borrowing is thus an important tool new firms 
can use to build their own reputations (Petkova, 2012). 
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Research has established the benefits of these reputable affiliates to the firms being 
endorsed; however, the presence and extent of a negative feedback loop when the signal 
subsequently proves inaccurate has generally been assumed, rather than empirically assessed 
(Connelly et al., 2011; Gammoh et al., 2006). The signaling literature has paid limited attention 
to when and to what extent there is a feedback loop that transfers stakeholders’ disappointments 
back to the endorsers, or whether and when the endorsers may be able to insulate themselves 
from potential negative consequences. While previous studies have focused on how positive or 
negative endorsement signals—such as third-party endorsements of bankrupt firms (Xia, 
Dawley, Jiang, Ma, & Boals, 2016), or theater companies’ endorsements by tainted firms 
(Shymko & Roulet, 2017)—affect the endorsees, scholars have not considered whether endorsers 
suffer any reputational damage when the actors they endorse fail to perform.  
We explore these questions in the context of newly-public firms’ delistings and the 
subsequent changes in the endorsing VCs’ reputation. Consistent with prior research (Gompers, 
1996; Hochberg, Ljungqvist & Lu, 2007; Lee et al., 2011; Ma, Rhee & Wang, 2013), our 
hypotheses focus on lead VCs. Lead VCs typically hold the largest investment stake in the 
company, and take primary responsibility for interfacing with the company’s leadership and 
coordinating the actions of the other VCs (Ma et al., 2013).  
Delisting of Newly Public Firms 
Endorsements by VCs raise expectations about newly-public firms’ potential. As such, 
when these newly-public firms delist, stakeholders are disappointed. Approximately 600,000 
new businesses are started each year in the U.S., and of those, only about 1,000 businesses 
receive VC financing. Thus, only about one-sixth of one percent of new ventures receives VC 
funding (Kaplan & Lerner, 2010). However, even this increased level of screening does not 
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ensure success; of these firms, only about 22.5 percent eventually manage to go public (Gompers 
& Lerner, 2004). Although this rate is much higher than for all startups generally, there is still 
great uncertainty about a startup’s likelihood of successfully going public, even with VC 
backing. Accordingly, an IPO is a rare accomplishment (Guler, 2007) that builds positive 
expectations regarding a newly-public firm’s potential.  
Further, every newly-public firm undergoes the intense scrutiny of various stakeholders 
(Pollock et al, 2010). The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) verifies that all material 
information about the firm has been disclosed, and that it meets all regulatory requirements for 
going public (Husick & Arrington, 1998). Knowledgeable potential investors also attend its 
“road show” (Certo, 2003)—where the startup’s management team and underwriters travel all 
over the country, and increasingly, the world, pitching the company to potential investors—
before making their investment decisions. Endorsements by reputable third parties provide 
additional confirmation of the firm’s potential (Lee et al., 2011) and set expectations for a 
promising future. However, despite this scrutiny (Sanders & Boivie, 2004), delistings still occur 
for various reasons that are often beyond the control of VCs, and sometimes the firm.  
Individual stakeholders are disappointed when their expectations are not met, and the 
higher their expectations, the greater their disappointment (Burgoon, 1978). Since third-party 
endorsements raise expectations, they also increase the “negative expectancy violation” 
(Burgoon & Le Poire, 1993; Kim, 2014)1 that occurs when those they endorsed fail to perform, 
because their endorsement makes the disappointment all the more surprising (Burgoon, 1978; 
Burgoon & Le Poire, 1993). In our context, when startups are backed by reputable VCs, 
expectations are raised about how they will perform, and so is the disappointment when 
                                                          
1 The reverse is also true: if stakeholders have negative or low expectations about the other’s behaviors but are 
pleasantly surprised, then positive expectancy violations occur. 
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delistings occur (c.f. Gulati & Higgins, 2003; Lee et al., 2011; Pollock et al., 2010). We seek to 
understand how stakeholders’ disappointment about these delistings can create a negative 
feedback loop that damages the endorsing lead VC’s reputation.  
Attribution Processes 
 Human beings have an innate desire to attribute successes and failures to individuals’ 
actions, even when the actual causes are beyond the individuals’ control (Heider, 1958; Kelley, 
1973; Mitchell, 1982). While individuals are eager to claim responsibility for positive outcomes, 
they are equally eager to find scapegoats and blame others for negative outcomes (Bowman, 
1976, 1978), and they tend to give lesser weight to situational constraints when making 
attributions than may be warranted (Jones & Harris, 1967). For example, Kang (2008) used 
attribution theory to explain why innocent firms were punished if they had board interlocks with 
firms undergoing SEC investigations for potential accounting irregularities. Gomulya and 
Boeker (2016) showed that while inside directors tend to protect CEOs following poor firm 
performance that can be attributed to outside causes (Salancik & Meindl, 1984; Staw, 
McKechnie & Puffer, 1983), they will replace CEOs following earnings restatements where the 
causal attribution is clearly internal.  
In our context, delistings that do not result from a merger are typically regarded as 
failures (Fisher & Pollock, 2004). As such, these failed companies’ stakeholders are likely to 
look for ways to blame others, rather than accept the blame for making a poor decision 
themselves. When combined with negative expectancy violations, the desire to find a scapegoat 
for this failure becomes especially strong. We argue that a primary scapegoat for delistings may 
be the endorsing VCs that were intimately involved with the delisted firm, and that raised 
stakeholders’ expectations with their endorsements.  
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Negative Feedback Loop from IPO Firm Delisting to the Endorsing VC’s Reputation 
While the culprits behind delistings are often beyond any single individual’s or firm’s 
control, attribution theory suggests that stakeholders still want a scapegoat to blame (Boeker, 
1992; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). We argue that they will hold accountable entities that they can 
identify and that influenced their expectations, even if they had only limited or even no 
connection with the causes of the delisting. As noted above, VC firms play only a partial role in 
the certification process (Certo, 2003; Gulati & Higgins, 2003; Lee et al., 2011; Pollock, et al., 
2010). However, while it is difficult or impossible for stakeholders to identify and single out 
road show attendees and SEC examiners, it is easy to identify the lead VCs who endorsed these 
newly public firms and raised their expectations. Scapegoating VCs for an IPO firm’s delisting is 
thus both plausible and possible.  
Further, VCs create expectations about a startup’s potential. Like many third parties, VCs 
reduce perceived uncertainties by providing startups with certification benefits (Gulati & 
Higgins, 2003; Lee et al., 2011). In contrast to other affiliates such as underwriters, who only 
provide certification benefits (Pollock et al., 2010), VCs also contribute to a startup’s skills and 
capabilities by providing direct benefits that affect their portfolio firms’ operating activities 
(Garg, 2013; Lee et al., 2011). VC firms contribute financial capital and provide help in 
formulating and implementing strategy, recruiting key personnel and acquiring needed resources 
(Garg, 2013; Jain & Kini, 2000; Sapienza, 1992). Because of their financial, operational and 
reputational investments in their portfolio firms, VCs have a vested interest in seeing startups 
succeed, and stakeholders therefore rely on VCs’ endorsements as signals of the startups’ likely 
success. 
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Given this, when newly-public firms delist shortly after their IPOs, an attribution process 
is triggered that feeds back to their endorsing lead VCs, damaging their reputations. Because of 
the direct role VCs can play in nurturing startups, this negative feedback loop may occur even if 
the VCs have little involvement with firms after their IPOs (Field & Hanka, 2001). Thus, we 
argue that the disappointment created by delistings coupled with the need to blame a scapegoat 
will generate a reputation penalty for the endorsing lead VCs. We therefore hypothesize,  
Hypothesis 1: Delistings by newly-public, VC-backed firms will be negatively related to the 
lead VC’s subsequent reputation.  
 
This hypothesis captures the baseline relationship between an IPO firm delisting and the 
endorsing lead VC’s reputation. However, signals can be distorted or clarified by environmental 
factors (Connelly et al., 2011). Thus, the magnitude of the reputational penalty the VC may 
receive can be enhanced or attenuated by the circumstances in which the relationship is 
embedded (Lester, Certo, Dalton, Dalton & Cannella, 2006; Sanders & Boivie, 2004). Our 
following hypotheses examine the moderating effects of different contextual factors (Graffin, 
Haleblian & Kiley, 2016) on the extent of the reputation damage endorsing VCs bear. 
Specifically, we consider the effects of the following factors on the magnitude of the lead VC’s 
reputation penalty: market reactions at the time of the IPO (i.e., the firm’s underpricing), the 
firm’s post-IPO firm performance, and the time between the firm’s IPO and delisting. 
Moderating Effects of Contextual Factors 
IPO underpricing. Underpricing, defined as the jump in stock price on the day a firm’s 
stock begins trading on a public exchange (Ibbotson & Ritter, 1995; Pollock & Gulati, 2007), 
creates positive expectations about a newly-public firm’s promise (Pollock & Gulati, 2007). 
Although a variety of reasons have been posited to explain IPO underpricing (Ibbotson & Ritter, 
1995; Tsang & Blevins, 2015), research has shown that high levels of underpricing can lead to 
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positive post-IPO outcomes for newly-public firms, including more traffic to their web sites, 
more alliance formations, greater analyst coverage, and more positive media coverage (e.g., 
Demers & Lewellen, 2003; Pollock & Gulati, 2007; Pollock, Rindova & Maggitti, 2008; Rajan 
& Servaes, 1997). The positive signaling effects of underpricing also persist over time (Pollock 
& Gulati, 2007). Prior research has also shown that high levels of underpricing benefit the VCs 
who fund the startups because they are credited with being able to spot and/or develop the most 
promising firms (Pollock et al., 2015), which is reflected in their ability to raise capital for 
subsequent funds (Lee & Wahal, 2004). High underpricing might even be treated as validation 
by investors of the VC firm’s endorsement; as such, stakeholders may be even more likely to 
attribute responsibility to and scapegoat the VCs who backed the firm. Thus, we expect that 
when a delisted portfolio firm experienced greater underpricing, the subsequent damage to the 
endorsing VC’s reputation will be greater. We therefore hypothesize, 
Hypothesis 2: The negative relationship between delisting and the lead VC’s subsequent 
reputation will be stronger the higher the portfolio firm’s underpricing. 
 
Post-IPO firm performance. Just as short-term market reactions at the time of IPO can 
enhance the negative effect of delistings on VC reputation, how the firm performs after its IPO 
also plays a significant role. That is, the likelihood that VCs are blamed by stakeholders is often 
a function of how the startup performs after their “independence” from the VC.  
In assessing whether the endorsing lead VC provided an accurate or inaccurate signal at 
the time of the startup’s IPO, it is important to consider what the endorsement is purportedly 
signaling. As noted earlier, VC firms provide a variety of resources beyond money that can 
enhance a start-up’s success (Garg, 2013; Jain & Kini, 2000; Sapienza, 1992). VCs provide these 
resources because they help startups overcome their liabilities of newness (Hannan & Freeman, 
1977; Stinchcombe, 1965). These liabilities include a lack of organizational structures and 
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routines for dealing with challenges that more established firms have developed over time, a 
need to create and fill new roles, a lack of trust based on prior interactions, and a need for 
relationships that can provide firms with necessary resources (Stinchombe, 1965).  
Once newly-public firms pass a certain performance threshold (Fama & French, 2004; 
Mouri, Sarkar, & Frye, 2012), stakeholders perceive that they have overcome these liabilities of 
newness and expect them to continue performing well. Thus, to the extent that stakeholders’ 
expectations are met following an IPO, they are more likely to feel that the IPO firm has lived up 
to the promise signaled by the VC’s endorsement. The independence and performance 
demonstrated by newly-public firms after their IPOs therefore helps to cognitively decouple 
portfolio firms from their VCs. In this way, any subsequent failures by IPO firms will be less 
likely to have negative feedback effects on endorsing VC reputations (Burgoon & Le Poire, 
1993; Graffin et al., 2016). Rather, stakeholders will be more likely to attribute a turn in the IPO 
firm’s fortunes to factors that its VCs could not have foreseen or influenced. We therefore 
hypothesize, 
Hypothesis 3: The negative relationship between delisting and the lead VC’s subsequent 
reputation will be weaker the higher the portfolio firm’s performance in the years 
following its IPO. 
 
Post-IPO survival duration. Another factor that may decouple portfolio firms from their 
VCs is their ability to survive (Hannan & Freeman, 1977; Stinchcombe, 1965). For new firms, 
continued survival suggests that they have overcome the liabilities of newness that VCs are 
expected to help new firms address. The longer newly-public firms survive, the more likely 
stakeholders are to believe that VCs have fulfilled their expectations, that the signals from the 
VCs’ endorsements were accurate, and that any eventual setbacks were due to reasons beyond 
what the VCs should be expected to predict or influence. In other words, like higher post-IPO 
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firm financial performance, surviving longer post-IPO signals greater independence and 
cognitively decouples portfolio firms from their VCs (Graffin et al., 2016). Thus, longer post-
IPO survival durations before delistings should at least partially attenuate the reputation penalty 
that the endorsing VCs might receive from delistings. We therefore hypothesize,  
Hypothesis 4: The negative relationship between delisting and the lead VC’s subsequent 
reputation will be weaker the longer the portfolio firm survives following its IPO. 
  
METHODS 
Data 
Our initial sample comes from a dataset of IPOs provided by Jay Ritter (see 
http://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipo-data/) and includes offering dates, offering prices, filing 
price ranges, closing prices, SIC codes and underwriter prestige rankings. We supplemented the 
IPO data with data on VC investments from Securities Data Corporation’s (SDC) VentureXpert 
database. We obtained data on the number of VC firms with an investment in each IPO at the 
time of the offering, the round dates, and the dollar value of each investment by each VC firm 
annually from 1990 to 2010. We distinguished VCs from buyout firms based on investment 
round. VCs’ investments take place in rounds that are classified as Seed, Startup, Startup 
Financing, Early Stage, First Stage Financing, Expansion, Later Stage, Balanced, or Research 
and Development. Manual web searches on sample firms in all investment categories identified 
by VentureXpert confirmed that these categories effectively include only VCs in our sample and 
exclude other types of private equity firms. We then collected market performance data from the 
Center on Research in Security Prices (CRSP), and firm financial data from COMPUSTAT. We 
also collected data from firm’s annual 10(k) and 8(k) filings, when possible, if the necessary firm 
financial data were missing from COMPUSTAT. 
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Since we are predicting the effect of delistings on the reputations of VCs that supported 
the firm, we applied several criteria to identify our target firms. First, the IPO firms must be 
backed by VCs. Second, we only included firms whose delisting was for negative reasons, as 
coded by CRSP and as agreed to by the SEC. Acquisitions were not treated as delistings since 
they are generally considered a successful outcome for young firms (Guler, 2007) and do not 
violate stakeholders’ expectations. We elaborate on this point when we describe the delisting 
variable below. Third, we only included firms where VC reputation data were available. Finally, 
missing data from COMPUSTAT and CRSP further reduced our sample size to a final sample of 
151 unique lead VCs. We then constructed a panel dataset from the year of IPO up to and 
including the fifth year after the IPO for a total of up to six years of observations per firm, 
resulting in 1,587 VC-firm-year observations.  
T-tests comparing the firms in our sample to IPO firms that were excluded (i.e., that were 
not VC-backed, were acquired, or for which VC reputation data was unavailable) showed that 
there were no differences in terms of age, revenues, total assets, ROA, and market-to-book ratio 
at the time of IPO (p=0.532, 0.618, 0.208, 0.579, and 0.641, respectively). The excluded and 
included samples also did not differ in terms of industry membership, which we tested by 
comparing the distribution of their 2-digit SIC codes using both Pearson’s chi-squared test 
(p=0.899) and a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distributions (p=0.376). 
Together, these tests show that sample selection bias is not a concern when drawing inferences 
from the included sample only. 
Measures 
Dependent variable. Our dependent variable is the lead VC’s reputation following a 
delisting event. Consistent with prior research, we defined the lead VC as the VC who owned the 
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greatest percentage of the company’s stock at the time of its IPO (Ma et al., 2013; Wright & 
Lockett, 2003). To measure VC reputation, we used a modified version of the LPJ VC 
Reputation Index developed by Lee, Pollock & Jin (2011), which is available at 
http://www.timothypollock.com/vc_reputation.htm.  
Lee and colleagues created an objective, multi-item, time-varying index that increases the 
reliability of the VC reputation measure and reduces the effects of random error (Boyd, Gove & 
Hitt, 2005). Their measure captures the theoretical dimensions of visibility and firm quality 
Rindova and colleagues (2005) identified by averaging the following formative indicators of VC 
firm reputation: (1) average of the total dollar amount of funds under management over the prior 
five years (‘Amount of funds’), (2) average of the number of investment funds under 
management in the prior five years (‘Number of funds’), (3) number of startups invested in over 
the prior five years (‘Number of companies’), (4) total dollar amount of funds invested in startups 
over the prior five years (‘Investment amount’), and (5) number of companies taken public in the 
prior five years (‘Number of IPOs’). These measures were standardized and summed, and the 
total score was then converted to a 100-point scale comparable across years. Although Lee and 
colleagues also included VC firm age in their index, we excluded VC firm age because the value 
of VC firm age increases monotonically as long as the VC firm does not fail, and thus cannot be 
influenced by the dynamics examined in this study. Nonetheless, we also tested our hypotheses 
using the original LPJ index that includes VC age and found similar results. 
The LPJ index has been used in several prior studies (e.g., Hallen & Pahnke, 2016; Lee et 
al., 2011; Pahnke, McDonald, Wang & Hallen, 2015; Park & Steensma, 2013; Petkova, 
Wadhwa, Yao & Jain, 2014; Pollock et al., 2015), and this is the only measure of VC reputation 
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that covers our entire period of study.2 It also offers the advantage that, as a multi-item measure, 
it more closely approximates the “true” value of the latent construct, compared to single-item 
indicators used in prior research that are more subjected to bias and random variation (Brown, 
2006; Hinkin, 1995; Worthington & Whittaker, 2006). In our robustness tests, we also examine 
the relationship between delistings and each individual component of the index. 
A potential concern posed by this measure is that it is an objective measure of reputation 
based on formative behavioral and performance indicators, rather than a perceptual measure of 
reputation (Hallen & Pahnke, 2016; Pollock et al., 2015). However, recent research by Hallen 
and Pahnke (2016) using a perceptual measure of VC reputation3 validated that the LPJ index 
accurately captures entrepreneurs’ perceptions of VCs’ reputations. They showed that when 
entrepreneurs were motivated and in a network position to assess a VC’s reputation accurately, 
their perceptions were consistent with the LPJ index measure.4 Further, even if stakeholders’ 
perceptions of delistings are negative and they blame the VCs, this does not necessarily mean 
that the stakeholders will change their actual behaviors. Our objective measure requires 
behavioral, as well as perceptual changes by stakeholders, and thus offers a more conservative 
test of our hypotheses. Finally, the LPJ index does not consider whether a portfolio firm is 
inactive or delisted in measuring the index’s components, ruling out the possibility that delisting 
                                                          
2 Earlier studies using LPJ index (e.g. Lee, Pollock, & Jin, 2011; Pollock, Lee, Jin, & Lashley, 2015) have not 
examined how delistings affect VC reputation. As such this study is different from and complements prior research. 
3 This study used a snapshot of data obtained from the website TheFunded in May of 2010 to assess the reputations 
of VCs that made at least one investment between 2009 and 2013. Thus, it covers a different and shorter period than 
the LPJ index, which provides annual reputation data from 1990 to 2010. 
4 While they also find unmotivated entrepreneurs’ perceptions were less accurate, as they used an absolute value 
measure that does not differentiate between over- and under-estimating a VC’s reputation, we cannot assess whether 
those who were less motivated tended to over- or under-estimate VCs’ reputations. Further, in our context, if 
stakeholders are unmotivated to collect the information necessary to assess a VC’s reputation, it also stands to 
reason that they will not pay attention to whether the firms they funded delist, and thus are unlikely to punish the VC 
for the delisting.  
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events, by construction, decrease VC reputation even in the absence of the theoretical 
mechanism we propose. We address the limitations of this measure in the discussion section. 
For our dependent variable, we used the VC firm’s reputation index value in the year 
after the focal year (t+1). However, as this value is likely to be determined at least in part by the 
VC firm’s past reputation (Pollock et al., 2015), we also controlled for the VC firm’s reputation 
index value in the focal year (t)5. When using panel data, inserting a lagged dependent variable as 
a covariate can introduce biases (Greene, 2012; Nickell, 1981). To address this concern, we used 
the Arellano-Bond estimation for our analyses, as discussed below. 
Independent Variables 
Delisting. Our key independent variable is whether or not a firm is delisted within five 
years following its IPO, which reflects IPO firm failure. We adopted the five-year cutoff because 
during this period a firm is typically still considered a newly-public firm (Ahmad & Jelic, 2014; 
Fischer & Pollock, 2004; Loughran & Ritter, 1995; Welbourne & Andrews, 1996). After five 
years, IPO firms are considered “seasoned” public entities. Empirically, we also examined the 
Kaplan-Meier survival estimate by examining the survival of the sample firms for up to 25 years 
after their IPOs. The survival estimate showed that the biggest drop in the survival rate occurred 
in the fifth year, validating our use of the five-year cut-off.  
Consistent with prior research (Fischer & Pollock, 2004), we included delistings by the 
primary exchange on which a firm is traded with delisting codes between 500 and 587. CRSP 
provides codes that indicate reasons for a delisting. Codes between 500 and 587 are associated 
                                                          
5 Failure to control for the past value of the dependent variable in the presence of path dependence leads to biased 
estimates (Greene, 2012). 
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with negative events such as firm bankruptcy and the firm’s inability to maintain the minimum 
size, shareholder number, and stock price requirements for continued listing on the exchange.6  
Our theory does not require assessing whether some reasons for delistings are “more 
negative” than others, and attempting to do so raises several thorny issues, such as whether all 
stakeholders would perceive different reasons the same way. Thus, we constructed a time-
varying dichotomous Delisting measure that is coded 1 in the year a VC is affected by the 
delisting of an IPO firm and 0 otherwise. Out of 370 firms in the final sample, 31 firms (8.4%) 
were delisted for the reasons we described above. The delisting occurred with the following 
pattern: 0 firms delisted in the IPO year, 4 delistings occurred in the first year after the IPO, 4 
occurred in the second year, 11 occurred in the third year, 5 occurred in the fourth year, and 7 
occurred in the fifth year after the IPO. The relatively small number of delisting makes our tests 
more conservative, because to yield any significant findings the relationship between delisting 
and VC reputation must be quite systematic and the effect size large. 7 
  IPO underpricing was operationalized as the difference between a firm’s opening and 
closing stock prices on its first day of public trading (i.e., closing price minus opening price) 
divided by its opening stock price, multiplied by 100. The data for this variable comes from the 
CRSP database. This measure was transformed into its natural logarithm to reduce the effect of 
                                                          
6 The specific reasons are: bankruptcy, issue withdrawn by underwriter, corporate governance violation, delinquent 
in filing, non-payment of fees, not meeting exchange's financial guidelines for continued listing, failing to meet 
exception or equity requirements, insufficient assets, capital, surplus, equity, market makers, number of 
shareholders, price fell below acceptable level, or for protection of investors and the public interest.  
7 One potential issue with our relatively small number of delistings is that they may somehow be biased relative to 
delisted firms not included in our sample. We identified 156 delistings that occurred during our study period that we 
could not include in our sample because we were unable to obtain complete data for all our measures. We conducted 
t-tests comparing the 31 firms in our sample to these firms on the following dimensions: IPO year, delisted year, 
founding year, total funds raised, total number of rounds, total number of VCs, age, revenue, ROA, market-to-book 
ratio, and VC ownership. There were no significant differences between the delisted firms in our sample and the 
other delisted firms along any of these dimensions, suggesting our delisted firms were representative of delisted 
firms, more generally. 
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outliers (we added the positive equivalent of the minimum value plus one to avoid log 
transformation of negative values) (Pollock & Gulati, 2007).  
 The newly-public firm’s post-IPO performance was operationalized in two ways: 1) 
using the newly-public firm’s industry-adjusted return on assets (ROA) for each year following 
its IPO, and 2) using the newly-public firm’s market-to-book ratio (MTB) for each year 
following its IPO.  
 Each firm’s annual ROA was adjusted for capital expenditures (Barber & Lyon, 1996) 
and calculated using a firm’s operating income before taxes, depreciation and special items, 
minus its capital expenditures, which was then divided by the firm’s total assets. Adjusting for 
capital expenditures helps offset the use of aggressive accounting practices by young firms who 
are about to go public. These firms face substantial pressure to make their performance look as 
good as possible, and are particularly prone to managing their operating performance (Teoh, 
Wong, & Rao, 1998). We further took industry differences into account by subtracting the IPO 
firm’s ROA from the average ROA of all publicly listed companies in the firm’s two-digit SIC 
code whose data were available from COMPUSTAT for the focal year. Because our data 
included some outliers, to minimize their effect we followed common practice and Winsorized 
ROA by 5 percent in each tail, where all data below the 5th percentile were set to the 5th 
percentile value, and data above the 95th percentile set to the 95th percentile value (Dechow, Ge, 
& Schrand, 2010).  
 The MTB ratio was calculated annually as the ratio of market value (operationalized using 
the annual number of shares outstanding multiplied by the firm’s annual stock price) over total 
assets. We obtained these data from the COMPUSTAT and CRSP databases. We transformed this 
ratio into its natural logarithm to reduce the effect of extreme values. Given that these ratio 
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variables may fluctuate around the time of delisting, we used a rolling average of the prior three 
years. For companies that were delisted less than three years after IPO, we used all the available 
information up to the current year. 
 Finally, the number of years a newly public firm has survived after IPO, or surviving 
years, was calculated on an annual basis by subtracting the IPO year from the current year. 
Control variables. Because the statistical approach we employed already controls for 
firm and VC fixed effects through orthogonal deviation (one variant of first-differencing; see 
Arellano, 2003:17), we did not include time-invariant control variables such as the year a firm 
goes public, or various pre-IPO characteristics of the firm, such as the number of investors and 
the number of investment rounds, in our models. However, we did include a number of time-
varying control variables to rule out alternative explanations. 
Firm characteristics control variables. We controlled for the following firm-level 
variables. First, we controlled for the newly-public firm’s age (‘Company age’), measured as the 
current year minus the year the firm was founded. Since firms varied significantly in age, we 
transformed this measure into its natural logarithm. We obtained the firm founding date from the 
firm prospectus available from the SEC’s EDGAR website. We also controlled for the newly-
public firm’s size (‘Revenue’), which was operationalized as the natural log of the firm’s 
revenues8 each year. Since some of the firms in our sample had no revenues in a given year, we 
added one to all values before transforming them. We obtained data for revenues from 
COMPUSTAT. Next, we added year dummies to control for year-specific effects, and thus any 
changes or variations that might exist or occur in the external environment at different years. For 
brevity however, we did not explicitly list the year dummies in our regression tables.  
                                                          
8 Other common proxies for size are total assets and market capitalization, but these measures were used to calculate 
the MTB ratio, and total assets were also used in calculating ROA. 
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Additionally, a lead VC’s ownership in a firm can vary significantly relative to other 
VCs’ ownership from year to year. To address the possibility that stakeholders may blame a VC 
more the greater its stock ownership, we controlled for the level of VC ownership. We first 
identified the lead VC’s ownership at IPO using data from the VenturXpert database. We then 
manually coded the VCs’ ownership each year following the IPO based on the values in the 
newly-public firms’ annual reports. The result is a time-varying measure of the VC’s ownership 
in the firm.  
Portfolio characteristics control variables. VCs can invest in multiple firms; thus, just as 
a focal firm influences its VC’s reputation, so can the other firms in the VC’s investment 
portfolio. We therefore controlled for the characteristics of the firms in a VC’s investment 
portfolio by including the following average values of its portfolio firms’ characteristics 
(excluding the focal newly-public firm): company age, revenue, ROA, MTB and VC ownership.  
Further, a delisting by any of the other portfolio firms a VC invested in could also hurt its 
reputation. Given that our focal independent variable is a delisting that is experienced by a focal 
portfolio firm, it is crucial to isolate the effect of delistings of non-focal portfolio firms funded 
by the same VC. We controlled for cumulative prior delisting events, which sums the delisting 
events by all of the VC’s portfolio firms except for the focal firm’s delisting for a rolling five-
year window beginning with the current year9. We used this five-year window because the 
effects of delistings by the other portfolio firms can persist for more than one year.10  
VC characteristics control variables. We also introduced various controls for the 
characteristics of the VC that could influence its reputation. First, its future reputation will be 
                                                          
9 We also re-ran our analyses using the number of delistings for all prior years, and the results were the same. 
10 In this circumstance, inserting just one-year lagged dependent variables may not be sufficient to capture all the 
effects of past delistings. We thank our associate editor for pointing this out.  
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related to the VC’s past reputation, so we controlled for the VC firm’s reputation index value in 
the focal year (Yt). 
Next, we controlled for the effect of VC firms’ status. Past studies indicate that VC 
firms’ status influences both their reputation (Lee et al., 2011; Pollock et al., 2015) and their 
strategic and investment performance (Dimov, Shepherd, & Sutcliffe, 2007; Hochberg, 
Ljungqvist, & Lu, 2007). We operationalized VC firm status using Bonacich’s (1987) beta 
centrality, calculated from the VC co-investment networks that were constructed using five-year 
moving periods. Beta, the attenuation factor, was set to 75% of the reciprocal of the largest 
eigenvalue (Podolny, 1993; Pollock et al., 2015). For the sake of readability, we rescaled the 
resulting scores by multiplying them by 100. 
We also controlled for structural holes in the VC’s investment syndicate network, and 
whether they had any investment preference for early stage. Both of these characteristics have 
been shown to affect VC reputation and investment performance (Lee et al., 2011; Podolny, 
2001; Pollock et al., 2015). Following the prior literature, we operationalized structural holes as 
one minus network constraint. Network constraint for a VC i is computed using the following 
formula (Burt, 1992:54):  
∑ (𝑃𝑖𝑗 + ∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑞𝑃𝑞𝑖
𝑞
) (𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑞 ≠ 𝑖, 𝑗)
𝑗
 
where P𝑖𝑗 is the proportion of direct ties from i to j. 
Investment preference for early stage measures the propensity of a VC to participate in 
early-stage investment rounds. We collected information from VenturXpert on a VC’s first 
investment (“company stage level 1”) in each company it funded. Company stage level 1 is 
broken down into Startup/Seed, Early Stage, Expansion, and Later Stage. We then computed the 
number of startup/seed and early stage investments as a percentage of its total initial investments.  
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Model Specification and Estimation Technique 
We modeled our theoretical process as a dynamic panel linear model as follows: 
Y𝑖𝑡+1 = ρY𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝑍𝑖𝑗𝑡𝛾 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜂𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡+1  ⋯ (1) 
where Y𝑖𝑡 represents reputation for VC i at time t, X𝑖𝑡 represents a vector of covariates of VC i at 
time t, 𝑍𝑖𝑗𝑡 represents a vector of covariates of firm j invested by VC i at time t, 𝜇𝑖 represents the 
fixed effects for VC i, 𝜂𝑖𝑗 represents the fixed effects for firm j invested by VC i, 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 represents 
the random disturbance, and ρ represents the degree of path dependence for reputation. 
It is worth noting that there are several potential statistical concerns to be addressed in 
this model. First, this model inserts a lagged dependent variable as a control variable to address 
the potential autocorrelation derived from the path dependent nature of our dependent variable 
(Arellano, 2003). However, this creates a dynamic panel bias (Anderson & Hsiao, 1982; Baltagi, 
2008; Nickell, 1981). Second, reverse causality is also a possibility. If a firm in which a VC 
invested is expected to delist, the VC may be motivated to adjust its investment behavior in 
anticipation of the delisting, which in turn could influence its reputation. Third, this model 
essentially treats the VC-firm-year as the unit of analysis. While this is necessary to test our 
theory, it also prevents information loss that would occur if firm-level data are aggregated up to 
the VC level.11 By using a VC-firm-year data structure we control for both VC fixed effects and 
firm fixed effects. However, because a single VC may invest in multiple firms at time t, their 
disturbances are likely to be correlated, potentially engendering “group-wise heteroscedasticity” 
(Greene, 2012: 322–323).  
We addressed all of these issues by employing the Arellano-Bond (AB) estimator 
(Arellano & Bond, 1991) with robust standard errors clustered at the VC level. The AB estimator 
                                                          
11 Note that if VC-year is chosen as the unit of analysis, all the firm-level data will be aggregated to the VC level.  
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effectively controls for within-group fixed effects through either first-differencing or orthogonal 
deviation12 (Arellano, 2003). It also addresses endogeneity of various kinds by instrumenting 
endogenous variables with valid instruments that are typically chosen from the lagged values of 
covariates. The lagged values are predetermined, so they cannot be associated with the 
disturbances as long as the disturbances are not serially correlated and appropriate lags are 
used.13 Further, the AB estimator is capable of incorporating robust estimation of standard errors 
at the group (i.e., VC) level (Greene, 2012; Roodman, 2009), thus addressing the group-wise 
heteroskedasticity arising from a VC investing in multiple portfolio firms. The AB estimator uses 
the generalized method of moments (GMM), which generates consistent and efficient estimates 
(Hansen, 1982; Hayashi, 2000).  
To run the models we employed the xtabond2 command (Roodman, 2009) with the 
cluster option specified at the VC level in STATA 14 (StataCorp., 2015).  
RESULTS 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for all variables. To test for multicollinearity, we 
calculated the variance inflation factor (VIF) for all models. The individual VIF for each 
covariate and the average VIF for the overall models were less than 10, with a maximum of 6.09 
and an average of 1.89, indicating that multicollinearity was not an issue (Neter, Wasserman, & 
                                                          
12 In our empirical analyses, we used orthogonal deviation rather than first-differencing because it creates fewer 
missing values and does not create serial correlation in the transformed errors (Arellano, 2003). 
13 Operationally, if a focal variable is strictly exogenous, all its lagged, current, and leading values can be used as 
valid instruments; if it is predetermined, its one-period or longer lags can be valid instruments; and if it is 
endogenous, its two-period or longer lags can be valid instruments. Because all the covariates except year dummies 
are possibly endogenous, two-period and longer lags are good candidates for valid instruments. However, given that 
our dependent variable is measured at t+1 instead of t, while covariates are all measured at t, one-year and longer 
lags can be used as valid instruments. We used the AR(2) test statistic, Hansen’s J statistic, and difference-in-
Hansen statistic to fine-tune the lag structure. We ultimately chose as instruments two- and three-year lags for the 
lagged dependent variable, one- and two-year lags for delisting, and two- to five-year lags with the collapse option 
for the rest of the potentially endogenous variables. The collapse option was used to mitigate concerns about too 
many instruments, which can weaken the reliability of the Hansen test (Roodman, 2008, 2009). 
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Kutner, 1990; Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). For ease of interpretation, all means and 
standard deviations are shown in their original metrics, prior to any transformations.  
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here] 
 
We report our results in Table 2. Model 1 presents the results for the control variables, 
Model 2 adds the main effect of delisting, Models 3 to 6 test each of the hypothesized 
interactions separately, and Model 7 presents the fully-specified model where all the interactions 
are included. Before discussing our findings, several points are worth noting. First, the test for 
second-order autocorrelation (i.e., AR(2)) indicated that there is no autocorrelation in the 
disturbances in differences (Arellano & Bond, 1991; Roodman, 2009). Second, Hansen’s J 
statistics for over-identifying restrictions were not significant, suggesting that the chosen 
instrument set is valid (i.e., exogenous), and the difference-in-Hansen statistics for each 
instrument group confirmed that all the instrument groups are also valid. Third, too many 
instruments can weaken the Hansen test (Roodman, 2008), one symptom of which is an 
excessively high p-value approaching one. While the suggested rule of thumb is that the number 
of instruments should not be greater than the number of individual (or cross-sectional) units, 
even this is considered too generous (Roodman, 2008). With this concern in mind, we 
conservatively kept the number of instruments lower than half of the number of cross-sectional 
units. All our models satisfy this condition. Together, these specification tests ensure that the 
reported parameter estimates are all consistent, and that the endogeneity concerns noted above 
have been addressed. 
Hypothesis 1 argued that the delisting of a newly public firm would be negatively related 
to the lead VC’s reputation score at t+1. Delisting has a significant and negative relationship in 
all models ranging from p=0.006 to p=0.035. Thus, Hypothesis 1 is supported.  
 
 
28 
 
 
To assess the magnitude of this effect, we calculated the effect size of delistings using the 
coefficient from the full model where all other variables are evaluated at their mean level. Here, 
the regression indicates that a portfolio firm delisting decreases VC reputation by 9.75, from 
30.77 to 21.01. To put this in context, the top thirty highest reputation VCs had LPJ index scores 
that ranged from 19.51 or better (in 1995) to 32.69 or better (in 2000) across our period of study. 
Thus, for the thirtieth-ranked VC, a delisting would be related to an approximately 50 percent 
drop in their reputation index value in 1995, and about a 30 percent drop in 2000. Even for the 
highest-reputation VCs, who (outside of the highest rated firm, which had a value of 100) had 
index values of 70-75, the drop in reputation is about thirteen percent. Thus, the practical effects 
of delistings on VC reputations are consequential. 
Hypothesis 2 argued that higher levels of underpricing would exacerbate the negative 
effects of delisting on the lead VC’s reputation. Models 3 and 7 test this hypothesis. The main 
effect of underpricing is dropped because the AB models treat them as a fixed effect.14 The 
results in both models show that underpricing has no significant moderating effect on the 
relationship between delisting and the level of the lead VC’s reputation at t+1. Hypothesis 2 
therefore is not supported.  
Hypothesis 3 argued that the negative relationship between delisting and the level of VC 
reputation at t+1 will be attenuated when the portfolio firm’s post-IPO performance is higher. 
We tested this hypothesis using both ROA and MTB as measures of post-IPO firm performance. 
                                                          
14 The main effect of underpricing was included in our analyses, but was dropped from the models by STATA 
because the Arellano-Bond models expunge fixed effects from estimation and underpricing is time invariant across 
observations for a given firm. However, its moderating effect is still captured by the interaction term because it is 
time-varying. To illustrate, assuming no other covariates, we have B1*X, where X = delisting, B2* Z, where Z = 
underpricing, and B3*XZ, the interaction. B2*Z = 0 because the main effect of underpricing is absorbed by the fixed 
effect; thus the interaction effect becomes Y = (B1 + B3*Z) * X, where Y is 0 for firms that do not delist (X=0). 
When there is a delisting (X=1), Y varies by B1+B3*Z, or varies with underpricing (Z). Thus, for those that delist, 
there is a common effect, B1, and an additional effect that reflects the interaction with underpricing (B3*Z).  
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For ROA, the interaction coefficient is not significant in either Model 4 or 7. However, the 
interaction using MTB is positive and significant in Models 5 and 7 (p=0.039 and p=0.067, 
respectively). Thus, Hypothesis 3 is supported when using market performance but not when 
using accounting performance.  
Hypothesis 4 argued that the negative relationship between delisting and the level of VC 
reputation at t+1 will be attenuated when the firm has survived longer after IPO. Models 6 and 7 
test this hypothesis. The results in both models show that the years survived after IPO has a 
positive moderating effect on the relationship between delisting and the level of the lead VC’s 
reputation at t+1 (p=0.025 and p=0.047, respectively). Therefore, Hypothesis 4 is supported.  
 To explore these relationships further, we plotted the interaction between delisting and 
MTB in Figure 1, and the interaction between delisting and post-IPO surviving years in Figure 2. 
We used the coefficients in the full Model for both figures. We employed values ranging from 
one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean for the MTB, 
and from one year to five years for the post-IPO surviving years.  
As Figure 1 shows, when there is no delisting event a VC’s reputation is relatively stable. 
The change in VC reputation for MTB values from one standard deviation below the mean to 
one standard deviation above the mean is −1.15 (from 29.17 to 28.01). However, when the 
portfolio firm is delisted, if the portfolio firm’s MTB is one standard deviation below the mean 
the VC reputation index value is 18.92, while at one standard deviation above the mean it is 
21.89. Thus, when portfolio firm MTB is one standard deviation below the mean, delisting 
reduces the lead VC’s reputation by approximately thirty-five percent ((18.92-29.17)/29.17). 
When portfolio firm MTB is one standard deviation above the mean, delisting reduces the lead 
VC’s reputation by approximately twenty-two percent ((21.89-28.01)/28.01). A change in 
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portfolio firm MTB from one standard deviation below to one standard deviation above the mean 
therefore attenuates about thirty-eight percent of the damage caused by the delisting.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Figure 2 shows that post-IPO survival duration has a significant attenuating effect on the 
reputation damage from a delisting. When a VC does not experience a portfolio firm delisting, 
their reputation scores again remain essentially flat (changing from 30.12 to 31.26). But when a 
portfolio firm delists, the lead VC’s reputation score ranges from 17.99 to 23.30 as the post-IPO 
surviving years increases from one year to five years. Thus, surviving one year results in a 40.3 
percent (12.13/30.12) decrease in the lead VC’s reputation score when a firm is delisted; in 
contrast, surviving five years results in only an 25.5 percent (7.96/31.26) drop in the lead VC’s 
reputation score. Thus, approximately 37 percent of the damage to the VC’s reputation is 
attenuated. Overall, while portfolio firm delistings are still damaging to the lead VC’s reputation, 
the damage is greatly reduced the longer the portfolio firm survives following its IPO. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
Robustness Checks and Additional Analyses 
In addition to our primary analyses, we conducted a variety of robustness tests to rule out 
alternative explanations and explore additional issues. 
Serving as non-lead VC. Lead VCs are likely to bear the brunt of any penalty costs 
because they are perceived to play an active role in developing startups and therefore expected to 
bear more responsibility for the startups’ decline (Gorman & Sahlman, 1989; Wright & Lockett, 
2003). However, it is also possible that when there is more than one VC investing in the 
company, the other “non-lead” VCs in a syndicate may bear some endorsement risks. These VC 
syndicates help spread the investment risk across multiple firms, allow multiple VCs access to 
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promising deals, and give the startup access to a greater variety of resources. Syndicates also 
reduce the risks to the startup by ensuring that no single firm owns too much equity in the 
company, should their relationship sours (Fund et al., 2008; Gompers & Lerner, 2004).  
To test whether non-lead VCs also suffer from penalty costs following an IPO firm’s 
delisting, we test if there is any significant negative relationship between delisting and non-lead 
VCs’ subsequent reputations. Table 3 summarizes the results. Our sub-sample analyses 
consisting of only non-lead VCs show that this relationship is not significant. The partial 
adjustment coefficient ρ capturing the influence of the one-year lagged DV on the current year 
DV is very close to 1 in the non-lead VCs sample, implying that for non-lead VCs covariates 
other than the one-year lagged reputation do not explain much of the current reputation. Further, 
Wald tests showed that the difference between the delisting effects on lead and non-lead VCs is 
significant. We utilized the following formula where the resulting statistic has a chi-squared 
distribution with one degree of freedom (Greene, 2012): 
(𝛽1 − 𝛽2)
2
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝛽1 − 𝛽2)
=
(𝛽1 − 𝛽2)
2
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝛽1) + 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝛽2) − 2𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝛽1, 𝛽2)
 
Because the covariance of the two-parameter estimates is not automatically computed 
from the separate samples, we followed the procedure suggested by Weesie (1999) and used the 
stack command in STATA. Estimation from the stacked dataset generates the exact same 
parameter estimates as those generated from each sample, and provides the covariance between 
the two-parameter estimates. For the Wald test, we used the test command in STATA. The null 
hypothesis that the coefficients of delistings for the lead and non-lead VC samples are equal was 
rejected at p<0.01, showing that delistings are more damaging for lead VCs than non-lead VCs.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
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Effect of delisting on individual VC reputation index components. To enrich our 
understanding regarding the reactions of different stakeholders, and to ensure that it was not just 
one indicator driving our findings, we examined the effect of delisting on each of the individual 
components of the VC reputation index. We found similar support for our main and moderating 
hypotheses when the dependent variables were: the number of startups invested in, and total 
dollar amount of funds invested in startups. That is, delisting hurts these individual VC 
reputation components (p=0.098 and p=0.009, respectively). Further, MTB (p=0.042 and 
p=0.044, respectively) and post-IPO survival duration (p=0.053 and p=0.098, respectively) 
partially attenuate the negative effect of delisting. However, we found no support for our 
moderating hypotheses when the dependent variables were the number of investment funds 
under management, the total dollar amount of funds under management, and the number of firms 
taken public—although the main effect of delisting is still supported (p=0.099, p=0.071, and 
p=0.066, respectively). We consider the implications of these findings in the Discussion section. 
Reasons for delistings. It is also possible that the newly-public firms who delisted might 
have done so for idiosyncratic reasons that could affect our results. To explore this issue further, 
we examined newspaper coverage of the firms’ delistings. We downloaded newspaper and 
newswire articles for each firm from one week prior to one week after their delisting. We then 
coded each article for what they said about the delisting. The results showed that the news 
articles mostly reported the fact that the company will be delisted, how the delisting might affect 
certain stakeholders, and what would be done with the firm’s assets. Thus there did not appear to 
be any idiosyncratic events driving the delistings.  
Jackknife analyses. Given our qualitative analyses of the reasons behind each delisting, 
it is very unlikely that our results are driven by outlier delistings. Nonetheless, as another 
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robustness check, we also ran our analyses using the jackknife estimation to help test the impact 
of any outliers. We conducted 31 jackknife-type replications of our AB model after excluding 
one delisting event at a time. We used the following formula (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005: 376): 
?̂?𝐽𝑎𝑐𝑘 = 𝑁?̂? − (𝑁 − 1)
1
𝑁
∑ ?̂?(−𝑖)
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
Where ?̂?(−𝑖) is the parameter estimate computed after the ith observation is excluded. 
The jackknife coefficient for delisting is -6.091, which is very close to the orginal -6.093 
AB coefficient. Further, H1 is supported at p<0.05 in all the 31 replications. The Jackknife 
coefficient for the interaction with MTB is 4.086, which is also close to the original 4.028 AB 
coefficient. Further, H3 is supported at p<0.10 in 27 of the 31 replications. While H3 is not 
supported in 4 replications, it is supported at p<0.05 in 6 out of the 27 supporting replications. 
Thus, in aggregate, the results from the Jackknife method are similar to the original results. The 
Jackknife coefficient for the interaction with surviving years is 1.052, which is again close to the 
original 1.041AB coefficient. Not surprisingly, H4 is strongly supported at p<0.05 in 29 out of 
31 replications. For the remaining two replications, H4 is supported at p<0.01 in one and at 
p<0.10 in the other. Taken together, the results from the jackknife replications are consistent 
with the original results. Thus, the possibility of having one extreme outlier driving our overall 
conclusion is extremely unlikely. 
Sample period. Another potential explanation for our findings is that our sample period 
also includes the dot-com boom and subsequent bust (Pollock & Gulati, 2007; Sine, Mitsuhashi, 
& Kirsch, 2006). If the majority of our delistings occurred during the dot-com bust, this 
environmental change may have been a driver of both the delistings and VC reputation. 
However, an examination of our data showed that only 35 percent of the firms in our sample 
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went public in 1999 and 2000, which is the peak of the dot-com bubble. As such, the dot-com 
bubble and its bursting are unlikely to be the primary drivers of our results. We also re-ran our 
analyses excluding this Internet bubble period and found that our results remained similar. 
(p=0.001, p=0.028, and p=0.045 for delistings, interaction with MTB, and interaction with post-
IPO surviving years in the full model, respectively). 
Moderating effects of firm size and age. Firm size and age have long been associated 
with liabilities of newness (Hannan & Freeman, 1977; Stinchcombe, 1965) that could also affect 
expectations about a firm’s odds of survival. Since smaller and younger firms face greater 
liabilities of newness, their failure may result in smaller expectancy violations. To explore this 
issue, we tested the moderating effects of firm size and age on the relationship between delisting 
and VC reputation. We measured firm size using three different proxies: a newly-public firm’s 
revenue, total assets, and its market capitalization. Like revenues, total assets and market 
capitalization were transformed into their natural logarithms to reduce the effect of extreme 
values. None of the firm size proxies had a significant moderating effect on delisting. IPO firm 
age did have a negative and marginally significant (p=0.081) moderating effect on delisting, 
suggesting that older firms are penalized more, but our primary results did not change (p=0.008 
for delistings). 
VC age as part of VC reputation. In our main analyses we excluded VC age as part of 
VC reputation because this value increases monotonically as long as the VC firm does not fail, 
and thus cannot be influenced by the dynamics examined in this study. Past studies have also 
excluded this variable depending on the study context (Lee et al., 2011; Pollock et al., 2015). 
However, as a robustness check, we included firm age as part of the VC reputation index and our 
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results did not change (p=0.004, p=0.077, and p=0.022 for delistings, interaction with MTB, and 
interaction with post-IPO surviving years in the full model, respectively).  
VC control after IPO. We argued that delisting may cause a negative feedback loop even 
when VCs no longer have substantial control over the newly-public firm. To assess this 
argument, we tested our hypotheses on a sample restricted to observations where the VCs had no 
ownership or board ties with the newly-public firms after their IPOs. Our findings for the main 
effect of delistings and its interaction with MTB were robust (p=0.006 and p=0.058 in the full 
model, respectively) when using this restricted sample. However, the interaction with post-IPO 
surviving years was no longer significant. This may be because this restriction drops some 
observations where VCs may still own shares. This exclusion thus truncates and compromises 
our measure of post-IPO surviving years.  
VC-year level of analyses. In our main analyses we examined our hypotheses with a 
sample where each observation refers to a VC-firm-year combination. We used this approach to 
test our theory and hypotheses linking firm characteristics with VC reputation. This also enabled 
us to better control for the fixed effect for each portfolio firm under each VC. For example, as 
each newly public firm has a different number of founders, the values of these variables in a VC 
portfolio will change over time as the VC invests in more firms. As such, aggregating the level 
of analyses from the VC-firm-year level to the VC-year level does not allow us to control for 
portfolio firm fixed effects or sources of unobserved heterogeneity such as unobserved 
relationships between a firm and its VCs, or the quality of founders at the time of IPO. Further, 
aggregating the level of analyses up to the VC-year level may lead to a loss of information, 
including but not limited to information loss caused by the fact that the summation of 
multiplication terms may not be equal to the multiplication of summed terms, a difference that 
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could be particularly problematic when it comes to examining interaction terms15. Nonetheless, 
in analyses not reported here we aggregated our data to the VC-year level to test the sensitivity 
of our main effect (i.e. delisting), and our finding continues to be supported (p=0.007). 
DISCUSSION 
In this study we considered whether firms that provided endorsements suffer reputational 
penalties when the firms they endorse fail to meet expectations, and the factors that influenced 
the extent of the penalty. Drawing on signaling theory (Connelly et al., 2011; Spence, 1973) and 
attribution theory (Bowman, 1976, 1978; Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1973; Mitchell, 1982), we argued 
that endorsements by reputable lead VC firms increase stakeholders’ expectations about the 
performance of their portfolio firms, and that when these firms subsequently fail to meet these 
expectations the lead VCs will suffer a reputation penalty. We also argued and found evidence 
that the newly-public firm’s market performance following the IPO, and how long it survived 
prior to delisting, partially attenuated the reputational penalty. As part of our robustness checks, 
we also found that the penalty only applied to the lead VC. Our findings have implications for 
both theory and practice. 
Theoretical Contributions 
Signaling theory has often assumed that those who provide inaccurate signals are 
penalized, but research has not explored whether this occurs or what factors influence the extent 
of the penalty (Connelly et al, 2011). Our study contributes to signaling theory by demonstrating 
that a negative feedback loop between a signal’s receivers and the signaler exists, and by 
explicating how the feedback loop functions. We theorized that stakeholders will look for a 
                                                          
15 How the information of interaction terms at the VC-firm-year level is lost when aggregated to the VC-year level 
can be understood by looking at the following inequality: ∑ (𝑋𝑖 ∗ 𝑍𝑖) ≠ ∑ 𝑋𝑖 ∗ ∑ 𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 . As an example, suppose that 
𝑋1 and 𝑋2 are 0 and 1 and that 𝑍1 and 𝑍2 are -0.3 and 0.3. The left-hand-side representing a VC-firm level 
interaction equals 0.3 while the right-hand-side representing a VC-level interaction equals 0.  
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scapegoat when an endorser’s reputation creates an expectation that is subsequently violated. We 
also argued and showed they are likely to focus on and punish those whose endorsement signals 
they relied on.  
Furthermore, our study extends research on the durability of these feedback effects by 
illustrating that the reputation penalties are not contingent on direct, ongoing linkages between 
the firms. Overall, VCs owned relatively little stock following the IPO; average VC ownership 
three years after the IPO was only 1.81 percent, and in 71 percent of the delistings the lead VC 
had no ownership at all. Further in 78 percent of the delistings the lead VC had no board 
representation during the year of the delisting. In our analyses we found that portfolio delistings 
affected lead VC reputations even after controlling for the VC’s ownership. However, our results 
also showed a marginally significant and negative main effect relationship between VC 
ownership and their reputations, suggesting that continuing to hold stock in a company was 
negatively associated with the VC’s subsequent reputation. Our results also remained unchanged 
when we used a restricted sample where the VCs held no post-IPO ownership in the firms. In 
additional analyses not shown here, VC ownership also did not moderate the effect of delisting 
on VC reputation. Thus, the attribution-based feedback loop does not appear to depend on 
continuing relationships. 
We also argued and found that the strength of the reputation penalty is influenced by the 
newly-public firm’s subsequent performance. Good market performance provides confirmation 
that the VCs have “done their job” helping young firms overcome their liabilities of newness, 
thereby decoupling the VCs from their portfolio firms and reducing the blame that VCs receive 
for the expectancy violation. Consistent with this argument, we also found that the reputational 
penalty to lead VCs was smaller the longer the firm has survived following its IPO. These 
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findings are important because they show that firm characteristics and behaviors can influence 
whether and to what extent the negative feedback loop occurs, but attributions of responsibility 
are not completely attenuated by situational factors (Jones & Harris, 1967).  
However, a firm’s accounting performance prior to its delisting did not have a significant 
moderating effect. A reassessment of our data also showed that only one firm had a positive 
ROA in the year prior to delisting, and that the average ROA in the year prior to delisting was 
−0.17. Thus, it appears that in our context, no firms had good operating performance prior to 
delisting, some were just “less bad” than others. In contrast, MTB was very positive for delisted 
firms in the year after their IPOs, but declined in later years. These differences in the 
performance measures may account for the differences in their influence. Future research should 
continue to explore how performance affects the attribution processes we consider here. 
We did not find any significant support for the moderating effect of IPO underpricing on 
the relationship between a portfolio firm’s delisting and lead VC reputation. We argued that 
underpricing should increase expectations, making the subsequent delisting more disappointing. 
However, higher underpricing also means that some stakeholders may have profited from the 
IPO, offsetting the disappointment that the firms are subsequently delisted. It’s also possible that 
whereas some stakeholders may have treated underpricing as a further validation of the VC’s 
endorsement that increased their expectations, as we argued, other stakeholders may have treated 
underpricing like good post-IPO performance, and thus it attenuated their attribution processes. 
Future research should continue to explore this issue, and the complexities associated with 
interpreting underpricing (Hubbard, Pollock, Pfarrer & Rindova, 2018; Tsang & Blevins, 2015). 
Our robustness tests also generated some interesting insights and theoretical implications. 
First, our analysis for non-lead VCs challenges the assumption that all endorsers will bear 
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endorsement risks. Rather, we found that the blame for delistings is only attributed to the lead 
VCs, likely because of their prominence and responsibility in funding and nurturing the startup. 
This finding is consistent with the findings of Pollock and colleagues (2010), who showed that 
whereas having one prestigious VC increased the market value of an IPO firm, a second 
prestigious VC added substantially less value, and a third prestigious VC added no additional 
value. Future research should continue to explore the signaling dynamics and reputational 
consequences when multiple possible signalers are involved. 
Further, our analyses decomposing the VC reputation index suggested additional nuances 
in how VC reputations are damaged by delistings. Our results remained robust for models with 
some dependent variables (the number of portfolio firms a VC invested in and the amount a VC 
invests in its portfolio firms) but not for others (the number of funds a VC managed, the total 
dollar amount of funds a VC managed, and the number of portfolio firms taken public). These 
findings suggest two potential explanations. First, delistings and contingency factors appear to 
affect VC reputation indicators that are more related to “output” dimensions of VC reputation—
that is, dimensions that are related to portfolio firms instead of the investors providing the 
“inputs” that the VCs invest. The startups seeking and receiving financing may be less willing or 
interested in accepting funding from VCs whose portfolio firms have failed following their IPOs 
(Hallen & Pahnke, 2016). It is also possible that the VCs will now have a harder time taking 
other portfolio firms public.  
Second, aspects of VC reputations that are more related to “input” dimensions are less 
sensitive, at least in the short term, to delistings than aspects related to “output” dimensions. 
Investors in the VCs’ funds may only pay attention to the funds’ overall returns, and not the 
particular investments that VCs make. Thus, delistings have little effect on the number of funds 
 
 
40 
 
 
raised or the total amount of money they manage. Taken together, these findings and their 
potential explanations suggest that future research should continue to explore how different 
stakeholders, with different interests and time horizons, may react differently to the same event.  
More generally, our study also contributes to theory on the dynamics of reputation 
development and loss, and shows how reputation can be easily damaged by distant events. 
Previous theorizing and empirical studies have focused on contexts where firm reputation is 
damaged by crises or proximal events (e.g. Gomulya & Mishina, 2017; Rhee & Kim, 2012; 
Zavyalova, Pfarrer, Reger, & Shapiro, 2012). We show that a firm’s reputation can also be 
damaged even when the events themselves are not within the full control of the affected firm. 
The implications of reputation damage extend beyond the same industry or ongoing relationships 
with the focal firm. Indeed, we show that reputation damage can be caused by negative events, 
such as delistings, simply because of the enhanced expectations created by reputable 
endorsements and attributional biases.  
Research has also shown that delistings are increasingly prevalent (Fama & French, 
2004) and that VC firms are willing to engage in actions at the time of IPO that can enhance their 
profits, even if they damage their portfolio firms’ performance prospects (Arthurs, Hoskisson, 
Busenitz, & Johnson, 2008; Fischer & Pollock, 2004). The implicit assumption here is that the 
VCs are unlikely to be affected when the IPO firm’s poor performance becomes manifest. Our 
findings suggest that more ex-post settling up occurs than has been presumed, and that 
attribution theory can be used to explain the negative feedback loop that exists when the signals 
provided by an actor’s reputation are perceived to be inaccurate.  
While reputations evolve based on positive and negative performance, most research 
tends to focus on the positive factors that help to build firm reputation (e.g., being known, being 
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known for something, and generalized favorability) (Lange et al., 2011). Our study serves to 
remind scholars that firm reputation is also formed by negative performance—both the focal 
actor’s and others’—even if their actions and the associated outcomes are separated in time. 
Further, because an actors’ actions are difficult to observe (e.g., whether VC firms provide 
resources and good strategic advice to its portfolio firms), stakeholders will often use subjective 
assessments of these actions during sensemaking. Firms that take self-serving actions cannot rely 
on time and opacity to shield their reputations from the consequences of providing signals that 
are perceived to be inaccurate. Stakeholders will look for culprits to blame, and they will blame 
those who helped create their expectations in the first place. Thus, our theory suggests that VC 
firms should prudently manage expectations, and consider the long-term interests of the firms 
they have endorsed. 
Finally, we contribute to the entrepreneurship literature by illustrating the long-term 
consequences to VCs for prematurely taking firms public in the hopes of quickly “cashing out” 
on their investments. Our results also suggest that young VC firms who “grandstand” (Gompers, 
1996; Lee & Wahal, 2004) by taking firms public too early may do more harm to their 
reputations than good if these firms ultimately delist at higher rates. VCs likely bear significant 
settling-up costs if they take actions that increase the short-term value of portfolio firm—and 
their investment in it—at the expense of its future viability.  
Managerial Implications 
 Our findings also have implications for practitioners – particularly those in professional 
service firms and other industries where a firm’s actual performance is difficult to observe, and 
their reputations hinge on the behaviors of other firms they are expected to influence. This 
includes law and accounting firms, in addition to financial services firms like venture capitalists 
 
 
42 
 
 
and investment banks. Our results suggest that the expectations these firms create about client 
firms can have long-lasting consequences for their own reputations. Further, they suggest that 
outcomes that confirm their initial expectations partially attenuate the damage to their 
reputations. Thus, firms concerned with protecting their reputations should temper the 
expectations they create, and try to ensure that near-term performance expectations are met.  
Limitations and Future Research 
All studies have limitations that suggest directions for future research. One limitation of 
our study is that we observe delistings of VC-backed firms in the US. Institutional and regulatory 
differences may result in different idiosyncrasies with regard to firm delistings and how they are 
interpreted in other countries. VC backing may also have differential signaling value in different 
countries, where their nature and role may vary. As such, future research should explore the 
extent to which our findings generalize to other national contexts. 
Another limitation of our study is that our VC reputation measure is formative and 
objective. Because it does not directly measure perceptions, we were only able to indirectly 
measure the perceptions of the stakeholders (e.g., insurance companies, university endowments, 
wealthy individuals, etc.) who invest in the VCs’ funds, or the entrepreneurs who receive their 
funding (Lee et al., 2011). These limitations primarily serve to make ours a conservative test of 
our hypotheses. Nonetheless, future research in other contexts should verify and extend our 
findings by employing longitudinal reputation measures that more directly reflect stakeholders’ 
perceptions.  
There are several other interesting opportunities for future research. One question is 
whether and how VCs can repair their damaged reputations following negative events, like 
portfolio firm delistings. If reputations are easily damaged, are they also easily fixed? And which 
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repair mechanisms (see Elsbach [2012] and Rhee & Kim [2012] for reviews of this literature) 
can be applied in this context? Can VCs convince stakeholders that delistings go beyond the 
scope of their influence? How long does it take before a tarnished VC firm reputation recovers? 
To what extent do current successes offset past failures?  
Future research should also examine the nature of negative events, and the actions (or 
lack thereof) that contributes to them. For example, it would be interesting to examine to what 
extent delistings can be reasonably attributed to the lack of due diligence by VCs or a premature 
push by VCs to exit an investment, versus to external factors genuinely beyond the control of 
both the VCs and portfolio firms, and whether these differences matter in the delisting’s effects 
on the VC’s reputation. Such an analysis can help us gauge whether stakeholders are reacting 
reasonably or unreasonably in punishing the VCs. 
Conclusion  
This study explores the consequences of providing inaccurate signals by examining the 
relationship between IPO firm delistings and the reputational damage it can cause to the VCs that 
endorsed them. Studies have shown that new firms receive signaling benefits from prominent 
affiliations (e.g., Carter & Manaster, 1990; Petkova, 2012; Pollock et al. , 2010; Stuart et al., 
1999). Our study shows that the endorser’s reputation can be damaged when the firms they 
endorsed perform poorly, and the signals their reputations provide thus fall short of expectations. 
It also shows that these effects can be partially mitigated by the endorsed firm’s market 
performance prior to its failure, and the time that has elapsed between the signal and the failure. 
In so doing, we contribute to signaling theory by showing whether there are consequences to 
endorsers for getting their “wires crossed.”   
 
 
44 
 
 
REFERENCES 
Ahmad, W., & Jelic, R. 2014. Lockup agreements and survival of UK IPOs. Journal of Business 
Finance & Accounting, 41(5-6): 717-742. 
Ahrens, F. 2010. Toyota’s shares slide as its reputation loses steam. Washington Post. 
Aldrich, H. E. & Fiol, C. M. 1994. Fools rush in? The institutional context of industry creation. 
Academy of Management Review, 19: 645-670. 
Anderson, T. W. & Hsiao, C. 1982. Formulation and Estimation of Dynamic-Models Using 
Panel Data. Journal of Econometrics, 18(1): 47-82. 
Arellano, M. & Bond, S. 1991. Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo evidence 
and an application to employment equations. Review of Economic Studies, 58: 277-297. 
Arellano, M. 2003. Panel data econometrics. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press. 
Arthurs, J. D., Hoskisson, R. E., Busenitz, L. W., & Johnson, R. A. 2008. Managerial agents 
watching other agents: Multiple agency conflicts regarding underpricing in IPO firms. 
Academy of Management Journal, 51(2): 277–294. 
Baltagi, B. H. 2008. Econometric analysis of panel data (4th ed.). Chichester, UK ; Hoboken, NJ: 
John Wiley & Sons. 
Barber, B. M., & Lyon, J. D. 1996. Detecting abnormal operating performance: The empirical 
power and specification of test statistics. Journal of Financial Economics, 41(3): 359–399. 
Boeker, W. 1992. Power and managerial dismissal: Scapegoating at the top. Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 37: 400–421. 
Bonacich, P. 1987. Power and Centrality: A family of Measures. American Journal of Sociology, 
92: 1170-1182. 
Bowman, E.H. 1976. Strategy and the weather. Sloan Management Review, 17(2): 49-62. 
Bowman, E.H. 1978. Strategy, annual reports and alchemy. California Management Review, 
20(3): 64-71. 
Boyd, B. K., Gove, S., & Hitt, M. A. 2005. Consequences of measurement problems in strategic 
management research: The case of Amihud and Lev. Strategic Management Journal, 
26(December 2004): 367–375. 
Brown, T. A. 2006. Confirmatory factor analysis for applied research. New York: The Guilford 
press. 
Burgoon, J. K. 1978. A communication model of personal space violations: Explication and an 
initial test. Human Communication Research, 4(2): 129–142. 
Burgoon, J. K., & Le Poire, B. A. 1993. Effects of communication expectancies, actual 
communication, and expectancy disconfirmation on evaluations of communicators and their 
communication behavior. Human Communication Research, 20(1): 67–96. 
Burt, R. S. 2004. Structural holes and good ideas. American Journal of Sociology, 110(2): 349-
399. 
Cameron, A. C., & Trivedi, P. K. 2005. Microeconometrics: Methods and applications. 
Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Carter, R., & Manaster, S. 1990. Initial Public Offerings and underwriter reputation. The 
Journal of Finance, 45(4): 1045–1067. 
Certo, S. T. 2003. Influencing Initial Public Offering investors with prestige: Signaling with 
board structures. Academy of Management Review, 28(3): 432–446. 
Chen, G., Hambrick, D. C., & Pollock, T. G. 2008. Puttin’ on the ritz: Pre-IPO enlistment of 
prestigious affiliates as deadline-induced remediation. Academy of Management Journal, 
 
 
45 
 
 
51(5): 954–975. 
Cohen, J., Cohen, P., West, S. G., & Aiken, L. S. 2003. Applied multiple regression/correlation 
analysis for the behavioral sciences (3rd ed.). Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates Inc. 
Connelly, B. L., Certo, S. T., Ireland, R. D., & Reutzel, C. R. 2011. Signaling theory: A review 
and assessment. Journal of Management, 37(1): 39-67. 
Daily, C.M., & Dalton, D.R. 2001. Signaling firm value through board structure: An 
investigation of initial public offerings. Entrepreneurship Theory Practice, 26: 33-50. 
Dechow, P., Ge, W., & Schrand, C. 2010. Understanding earnings quality: A review of the 
proxies, their determinants and their consequences. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 
50(2-3): 344–401.  
Demers, E., & Lewellen, K. 2003. The marketing role of IPOs: Evidence from internet stocks. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 68: 413–437. 
Deutsch, Y., & Ross, T. W. 2003. You are known by the directors you keep: Reputable directors 
as a signaling mechanism for young firms. Management Science, 49(8): 1003–1017. 
Dimov, D., Shepherd, D. A., & Sutcliffe, K. M. 2007. Requisite expertise, firm reputation, and 
status in venture capital investment allocation decisions. Journal of Business Venturing, 
22(4): 481-502. 
Elsbach, K.D. 2012. A framework for reputation management over the course of evolving 
controversies. In M.L. Barnett & T.G. Pollock (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Corporate 
Reputation: 466-485. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Fama, E. F., & French, K. R. 2004. New lists: Fundamentals and survival rates. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 73(2): 229–269.  
Field, L. C., & Hanka, G. 2001. The expiration of IPO share lockups. The Journal of Finance, 
56(2): 471–500. http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/0022-1082.00334. 
Fischer, E., & Reuber, R. 2007. The Good, the bad, and the unfamiliar: The challenges of 
reputation formation facing new firms. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 
January(416): 53–75. 
Fischer, H. M., & Pollock, T. G. 2004. Effects of Social Capital and Power on Surviving 
Transformational Change: the Case of Initial Public Offerings. Academy of Management 
Journal, 47(4): 463–481.  
Fombrun, C. J. 2001. Corporate reputations as economic assets. The Blackwell Handbook of 
Strategic Management: 289–312. 
Fund, B. R., Pollock, T. G., Baker, T., & Wowak, A. J. 2008. Who’s the new kid? The process of 
developing centrality in venture capitalist deal networks. Network Strategy: 563–593. 
Garg, S. 2013. Venture boards: Distinctive monitoring and implications for firm performance. 
Academy of Management Review, 38: 90–108. 
Gompers, P. A. 1996. Grandstanding in the venture capital industry. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 42(1): 133–156. 
Gompers, P. A., & Lerner, J. 2004. The venture capital cycle. Chicago: MIT press. 
Gomulya, D., & Boeker, W. 2016. Reassessing board member allegiance: CEO replacement 
following financial misconduct. Strategic Management Journal, 37(9): 1898–1918. 
Gomulya, D., & Mishina, Y. 2017. Signaler credibility , signal susceptibility, and relative 
reliance on signals: How stakeholders change their evaluative processes after violation of 
expectations and rehabilitative efforts. Academy of Management Journal, Forthcoming. 
Gorman, M., & Sahlman, W. A. 1989. What do venture capitalists do? Journal of Business 
 
 
46 
 
 
Venturing, 4(4): 231–248. 
Graffin, S.D., Haleblian, J. & Kiley, J.T. 2016. Ready, AIM, acquire: Impression offesetting and 
acquisitions. Academy of Management Journal, 59(1): 232- 252. 
Greene, W. H. 2012. Econometric analysis, Harlow. 
Gulati, R., & Higgins, M. C. 2003. Which ties matter when? The contingent effects of 
interorganizational partnerships on IPO success. Strategic Management Journal, 24(2): 
127–144. http://doi.wiley.com/10.1002/smj.287, July 29, 2014. 
Guler, I. 2007. Throwing good money after bad? Political and institutional influences on 
sequential decision making in the venture capital industry. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 52: 248–285. 
Hallen, B.L. & Pahnke, E.C. 2016. When do entrepreneurs accurately evaluate venture capital 
firsm' track records? A bounded rationality perspective. Academy of Management Journal, 
59(5): 1535-1560. 
Hannan, M.T., & Freeman, J. 1977. The population ecology of organizations. American Journal 
of Sociology, 82: 929-964.  
Hansen, L. P. 1982. Large Sample Properties of Generalized-Method of Moments Estimators. 
Econometrica, 50(4): 1029-1054. 
Hayashi, F. 2000. Econometrics. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Heider, F. 1958. The psychology of interpersonal relations. New York: Wiley. 
Higgins, M. C., & Gulati, R. 2003. Getting off to a good start: The effects of upper echelon 
affiliations on underwriter prestige. Organization Science, 14(3), 244-263. 
Higgins, M. C., & Gulati, R. 2006. Stacking the deck: The effects of top management backgrounds 
on investor decisions. Strategic Management Journal, 27(1), 1-25. 
Hinkin, T. R. 1995. A review of scale development practices in the study of organizations. Journal 
of Management, 21(5): 967-988. 
Hochberg, Y. V., Ljungqvist, A., & Lu, Y. 2007. Whom You Know Matters: Venture Capital 
Networks and Investment Performance. The Journal of Finance, 62(1): 251. 
Hsu, D. H. 2004. What do entrepreneurs pay for Venture Capital affiliation? Journal of 
Finance, 59(4): 1805–1844. 
Hubbard, T. D., Pollock, T. G., Pfarrer, M. D. & Rindova, V. P. 2018. Safe bets or hot hands? 
How status and celebrity influence strategic alliance formations by newly public firms. 
Academy of Management Journal, In Press. 
Husick, G. C., & Arrington, J. M. 1998. The initial public offering: A practical guide for 
executives. New York: Bowne & Co. 
Ibbotson, R. G., & Ritter, J. R. 1995. Initial public offerings. In R. Jarrow et al. (Ed.), 
Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science: 993–1016. Elsevier 
Science B.V. 
Jain, B. A., & Kini, O. 2000. Does the presence of Venture Capitalists improve the survival 
profile of IPO Firms? Journal of Business Venturing, 27(9): 1139–1176. 
Johnson-Hall, T. D. 2017. Ensuring food safety by preventing food recalls: The impact of locus 
of failure, regulatory agency discovery, breadth, and firm size on corrective action. Journal 
of Marketing Channels, 24(3-4): 115-135. 
Jones, E. E. & Harris, V. A. 1967. The attribution of attitudes. Journal of experimental social 
psychology, 3(1): 1-24. 
Kang, E. 2008. Director interlocks and spillover effects of reputational penalties from financial 
reporting fraud. Academy of Management Journal, 51(3): 537–555. 
 
 
47 
 
 
Kaplan, S. N., & Lerner, J. 2010. It ain’t broke:The past, present, and future of Venture Capital. 
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 22(2): 36–47. 
Kelley, H.H., 1973. The process of causal attributions. American Psychologist, 28: 107-128. 
Kim, S. 2014. The role of prior expectancies and relational satisfaction in crisis. Journalism & 
Mass Communication Quarterly, 91(1): 139–158.  
Lange, D., Lee, P. M., & Dai, Y. 2011. Organizational reputation: A review. Journal of 
Management, 37(1): 153–184. 
Lee, P. M., Pollock, T. G., & Jin, K. 2011. The contingent value of venture capitalist reputation. 
Strategic Organization, 9(1): 33–69. 
Lee, P. M., & Wahal, S. 2004. Grandstanding, certification and the underpricing of venture 
capital backed IPOs. Journal of Financial Economics, 73(2): 375–407. 
Lerner, J. 1995. Venture Capitalists and the oversight of private firms. The Journal of Finance, 
50(1): 301–318. 
Lester, R. H., Certo, S. T., Dalton, C. M., Dalton, D. R., & Cannella, A. A. 2006. Initial public 
offering investor valuations: An examination of top management team prestige and 
environmental uncertainty. Journal of Small Business Management, 44: 1-26. 
Loughran, T., & Ritter, J. R. 1995. The new issues puzzle. The Journal of Finance, 50(1): 23–
51. 
Ma, D., Rhee, M., & Yang, D. 2013. Power source mismatch and the effectiveness of 
interorganizational relations: The case of venture capital syndication. Academy of 
Management Journal, 56(3): 711-734. 
Mishina, Y., Block, E. S., & Mannor, M. J. 2012. The path dependence of organizational 
reputation: How social judgment influences assessments of capability and character. 
Strategic Management Journal, 33: 459–477. 
Mitchell, T.R., 1982. Attributions and actions: A note of caution. Journal of Management, 8: 
65-74. 
Mouri, N., Sarkar, M. B., & Frye, M. 2012. Alliance portfolios and shareholder value in post-
IPO firms: The moderating roles of portfolio structure and firm-level uncertainty. Journal of 
Business Venturing, 27(3): 355–371.  
Neter, J., Wasserman, W., & Kutner, M. H. 1990. Applied linear statistical models: regression, 
analysis of variance, and experimental designs. Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin. 
Nickell, S. 1981. Biases in dynamic models with fixed effects. Econometrica, 49(6): 1417-1426. 
Pahnke, E.C., McDonald, R., Wange, D. & Hallen, B. 2015. Exposed: Venture capital, 
competitor ties and Entrepreneurial innovation. Academy of Management Journal, 58(5): 
1334-1360. 
Park, H.D. & Steensma, H.K. 2013. The selection and nurturing effects of corporate investors on 
new venture innovativeness. Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal, 7(4): 311-330. 
Paruchuri, S. & Misangyi, V. F. 2015. Investor perceptions of financial misconduct: The 
heterogeneous contamination of bystander firms. Academy of Management Journal, 58(1): 
169-194. 
Petkova, A. 2012. From the ground up: Building young firms’ reputations. The Oxford 
Handbook of Corporate Reputation: 383–401. 
Petkova, A.P., Wadhwa, A., Yao, X. & Jain, S. 2014. Reputation and decision making under 
ambiguity: A study of U.S. venture capital firms' investments in the emerging clean energy 
sector. Academy of Management Journal, 57(2): 422-448.  
Pfarrer, M. D., Decelles, K. A., Smith, K. G., & Taylor, M. S. 2008. After the fall: Reintegrating 
 
 
48 
 
 
the corrupt organization. Academy of Management Review, 33(3): 730–749. 
Pfarrer, M. D., Pollock, T. G., & Rindova, V. P. 2010. A tale of two assets: The effects of firm 
reputation and celebrity on earnings surprises and investors' reactions. Academy of 
Management Journal, 53(5): 1131-1152. 
Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. R. 1978. The external control of organizations: A resource 
dependence perspective. New York: Harper & Row. 
Podolny, J. 1993. A Status-Based Model of Market Competition. American Journal of 
Sociology, 98: 829–872. 
Podolny, J. 2001. Networks as the Pipes and Prisms of the Market. American Journal of 
Sociology, 107(1): 33-60. 
Pollock, T. G. 2004. The benefits and costs of underwriters' social capital in the U.S. initial 
public offerings market. Strategic Organization, 2(4): 357-388. 
Pollock, T. G., Chen, G., Jackson, E. M., & Hambrick, D. C. 2010. How much prestige is 
enough? Assessing the value of multiple types of high-status affiliates for young firms. 
Journal of Business Venturing, 25(1): 6–23.  
Pollock, T. G., & Gulati, R. 2007. Standing out from the crowd: The visibility-enhancing effects 
of IPO-related signals on alliance formation by entrepreneurial firms. Strategic 
Organization, 5(4): 339–372.  
Pollock, T. G., Lee, P. M., Jin, K., & Lashley, K. 2015. (Un) Tangled Exploring the Asymmetric 
Coevolution of New Venture Capital Firms’ Reputation and Status. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 60(3): 482-517. 
Pollock, T. G., Rindova, V. P., & Maggitti, P. G. 2008. Market watch: Information and 
availability cascades among the media and investors in the U.S. IPO market. Academy of 
Management Journal, 51(2): 335–358. 
Rajan, R., & Servaes, H. 1997. Analyst following of Initial Public Offerings. Journal of 
Finance, 52(2): 507–529. 
Rao, D. 2013. Why 99.95% of entrepreneurs should stop wasting time seeking venture capital. 
Forbes, July 22, 0213. https://www.forbes.com/sites/dileeprao/2013/07/22/why-99-95-of-
entrepreneurs-should-stop-wasting-time-seeking-venture-capital/#41ddaddc46eb. Accessed 
10/2/17. 
 Reuber, A. R. & Fischer, E. 2005. The company you keep: How young firms in different 
competitive contexts signal reputation through their customers. Entrepreneurship Theory 
and Practice, 29(10: 57-78. 
Rhee, M. & Haunschild, P. R. 2006. The liability of good reputation: A study of product recalls 
in the U.S. automobile industry. Organization Science, 17(1): 101–117.  
Rhee, M. & Kim, T. 2012. After the collapse: A behavioral theory of reputation repair. In M.L. 
Barnett & T.G. Pollock (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Reputation: 446-465. 
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Rindova, V. P., Williamson, I. O., Petkova, A. P., & Sever, J. M. 2005. Being good or being 
known: An empirical examination of the dimensions, antecendents, and consequences of 
organizational reputation. Academy of Management Journal, 48(6): 1033–1049. 
Roodman, D. 2008. A Note on the Theme of Too Many Instruments.: The Center for Global 
Development. 
Roodman, D. 2009. How to do xtabond2: An introduction to difference and system GMM in Stata. 
The Stata Journal, 9(1): 86-136. 
Salancik, G. R., & Meindl, J. R. 1984. Corporate Attributions as Strategic Illusions of 
 
 
49 
 
 
Management Control. Administrative Science Quarterly, 29(2): 238. 
Sanders, W. G., & Boivie, S. 2004. Sorting things out: Valuation of new firms in uncertain 
markets. Strategic Management Journal, 25(2): 167–186. 
Sapienza, H. J. 1992. When do venture capitalists add value? Journal of Business Venturing, 
7(1): 9–27. 
Shymko, Y., & Roulet, T. J. 2017. When does Medici hurt da Vinci? Mitigating the signaling 
effect of extraneous stakeholder relationships in the field of cultural production. Academy of 
Management Journal, 60(4): 1307-1338. 
Sine, W. D., Mitsuhashi, H., & Kirsch, D. A. 2006. Revisiting Burns and Stalker: Formal 
structure and new venture performance in emerging economic sectors. Academy of 
Management Journal, 49(1): 121–132. 
Spence, M. 1973. Job market signaling. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87(3): 355-374. 
StataCorp. 2015. Stata: Release 14. Statistical Software. College Station, TX: StataCorp LP. 
Stinchcombe, A. L. 1965. Social structure and organizations. In J.G. March (Ed.), Handbook of 
Organizations: 142-193. Chicago: Rand McNally. 
Stuart, T. E., Hoang, H., & Hybels, R. C. 1999. Interorganizational endorsements and the 
performance of entrepreneurial ventures. Administrative Science Quarterly, 44(2): 315–
349.  
Teoh, S. H., Wong, T. J., & Rao, G. R. 1998. Are accruals during Initial Public Offerings 
opportunistic? Review of Accounting Studies, 3: 175–208.  
Tsang, E. W., & Blevins, D. P. 2015. A critique of the information asymmetry argument in the 
management and entrepreneurship underpricing literature. Strategic Organization, 13: 247–
258. 
Weesie, J. 1999. Seemingly unrelated estimation and the cluster-adjusted sandwich estimator. 
Stata Technical Bulletin, 52: 34–47. 
Weiner, B. 1986. An attributional theory of motivation and emotion. New York: Springer-
Verlag. 
Welbourne, T. M., & Andrews, A. O. 1996. Predicting the performance of Initial Public 
Offerings: Should human resource management be in the equation? Academy of 
Management Journal, 39(4): 891–919. 
Worthington, R. L. & Whittaker, T. A. 2006. Scale Development Research. A Content Analysis 
and Recommendations for Best Practices. The Counseling Psychologist, 34(6): 806-838. 
Wright, M., & Lockett, A. 2003. The structure and management of alliances: syndication in the 
venture capital industry. Journal of Management Studies, 40: 2073–2102. 
 Xia, J., Dawley, D. D., Jiang, H., Ma, R., & Boal, K. B. 2016. Resolving a dilemma of signaling 
bankrupt firm emergence: A dynamic integrative view. Strategic Management 
Journal, 37(8): 1754-1764 
Zavyalova, A., Pfarrer, M. D., Reger, R. K., & Shapiro, D. L. 2012. Managing the message: The 
effects of firm actions and industry spillovers on media coverage following wrongdoing. 
Academy of Management Journal, 55(5): 1079–1101. 
 
 
 
 
50 
 
 
TABLE 1 
Correlation Table and Descriptive Statisticsa 
 
 
   Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
V
C
-l
ev
el
  
at
tr
ib
u
te
s 
1. Reputation 31.54 22.33                            
2. Status 8.33 5.13 0.89                 
3. Structural holes 1.01 0.14 0.53 0.62                
4. 
Investment preference for 
early stage 0.58 0.20 0.22 0.25 0.07               
P
o
rt
fo
li
o
-l
ev
el
 a
tt
ri
b
u
te
s 
ex
cl
. 
fo
ca
l 
fi
rm
 a
tt
ri
b
u
te
s 
5. Company age 8.13 4.51 0.35 0.36 0.40 0.12              
6. Revenue 136.85 344.13 0.53 0.50 0.47 0.08 0.78             
7. 
ROA (Industry-adjusted net 
income/assets) -0.08 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.09 -0.05 -0.08 0.26            
8. MTB 2.39 1.45 0.40 0.48 0.28 0.21 0.56 0.50 -0.06           
9. VC ownership 2.20 2.94 0.16 0.07 0.21 0.07 0.21 0.18 -0.12 0.10          
10. 
Other delisting events in the 
portfolio firms 0.60 1.01 0.39 0.34 0.27 0.09 0.19 0.33 0.10 0.19 0.08         
F
ir
m
-l
ev
el
 a
tt
ri
b
u
te
s 
11. Underpricing (%) 43.77 57.60 0.09 0.07 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.20 0.12 0.01 -0.07 0.25        
12. Firm age 10.41 4.91 -0.09 -0.11 -0.06 -0.17 -0.06 -0.04 0.11 -0.05 -0.04 -0.13 -0.11       
13. Revenue 183.64 880.72 0.19 0.14 0.15 0.05 0.08 0.22 0.20 -0.03 0.00 0.16 0.22 0.10      
14. 
ROA (Industry-adjusted 
EBIT/assets) -0.17 0.26 0.00 0.02 0.04 -0.02 0.02 0.13 0.25 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 0.01 0.23 0.54     
15. MTB 2.69 1.74 0.13 0.12 -0.03 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.16 -0.08 0.10 0.11    
16. VC ownership (%) 2.58 4.93 0.01 -0.08 0.04 -0.08 -0.09 -0.08 -0.02 -0.16 0.21 -0.01 -0.11 -0.08 -0.06 -0.05 -0.13   
17. Surviving years 3.75 0.62 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.08 0.14 0.11 -0.11 0.08 -0.01 0.09 0.15 0.07 0.03 0.08 0.08 -0.23  
18. Delisting 0.08 0.28 -0.04 -0.03 0.00 -0.09 -0.06 -0.04 0.01 -0.05 0.02 0.10 -0.01 -0.16 -0.13 -0.34 -0.21 -0.02 -0.16 
 
 
a Data are deleted listwise. Means and standard deviations are reported at firm level in the original metric; correlations whose absolute values are greater than 
0.10 are significant at p < 0.05. 
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TABLE 2 
Arellano–Bond Dynamic Panel GMM Estimates for Lead VC reputation at t+1a 
  VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
V
C
-l
ev
el
  
a
tt
ri
b
u
te
s 
Reputationt 
0.784*** 0.824*** 0.831*** 0.821*** 0.809*** 0.830*** 0.823*** 
(0.062) (0.061) (0.061) (0.063) (0.063) (0.062) (0.063) 
Statust 
0.156 0.035 0.056 0.029 0.031 0.014 0.036 
(0.344) (0.299) (0.290) (0.301) (0.306) (0.303) (0.299) 
Structural holes 
-1.437 -1.817 -2.820 -1.469 -0.516 -1.800 -1.682 
(5.342) (3.342) (3.658) (3.394) (3.765) (3.545) (4.223) 
Investment preference for early 
stage 
3.156 2.732 3.788+ 2.858 2.645 2.476 3.247 
(2.473) (2.136) (2.074) (2.124) (2.117) (2.127) (2.050) 
P
o
rt
fo
li
o
-l
ev
el
 a
tt
ri
b
u
te
s 
ex
cl
. 
fo
ca
l 
fi
rm
 a
tt
ri
b
u
te
s Company age 
-0.841 -1.118 -1.149 -1.117 -0.919 -1.052 -0.908 
(0.815) (0.772) (0.766) (0.790) (0.730) (0.768) (0.760) 
Revenue 
-0.530 -0.495 -0.486 -0.507 -0.468 -0.487 -0.448 
(0.474) (0.477) (0.496) (0.497) (0.468) (0.482) (0.505) 
ROA (Industry-adjusted net 
income/assets) 
-2.726+ -3.737* -3.790* -3.798* -3.395* -3.333* -3.084* 
(1.393) (1.649) (1.655) (1.625) (1.560) (1.589) (1.549) 
MTB 
0.250 0.390 0.354 0.368 0.274 0.358 0.240 
(0.290) (0.310) (0.297) (0.289) (0.276) (0.299) (0.275) 
VC ownership 
-0.192 -0.220+ -0.246+ -0.220+ -0.204+ -0.224+ -0.231+ 
(0.118) (0.118) (0.135) (0.121) (0.115) (0.119) (0.133) 
Other delisting events in the 
portfolio firms 
-0.772* -0.722+ -0.592+ -0.773+ -0.730* -0.724+ -0.575 
(0.357) (0.380) (0.359) (0.417) (0.352) (0.371) (0.378) 
F
o
ca
l 
fi
rm
 a
tt
ri
b
u
te
s 
Company age 
-5.606+ -3.722 -3.940 -3.996 -4.999* -4.797* -5.818* 
(2.896) (2.535) (2.543) (2.491) (2.387) (2.391) (2.649) 
Revenue 
1.397* 0.384 0.495 0.405 0.704 0.600 0.929 
(0.685) (0.553) (0.616) (0.575) (0.613) (0.569) (0.685) 
ROA (Industry-adjusted net 
income/assets) 
0.318 0.336 0.167 0.436 0.697 0.476 0.624 
(1.053) (1.027) (1.115) (1.016) (1.018) (0.988) (1.065) 
MTB 
-1.239+ -0.608 -0.438 -0.655 -1.074+ -0.926 -1.128 
(0.720) (0.614) (0.667) (0.590) (0.652) (0.614) (0.690) 
VC ownership 
-0.085+ -0.074+ -0.066 -0.078+ -0.077+ -0.085+ -0.076 
(0.048) (0.043) (0.043) (0.046) (0.044) (0.047) (0.047) 
Surviving years 
0.028 0.159 0.268 0.162 0.165 0.204 0.286 
(0.369) (0.349) (0.398) (0.355) (0.356) (0.360) (0.399) 
Delisting 
  -6.093* -6.508* -6.932* -9.106** -11.562** -13.169** 
  (2.393) (2.636) (3.282) (3.303) (4.418) (4.769) 
Delisting X Underpricing 
   3.991    3.594 
   (3.242)    (3.035) 
Delisting X ROA 
    -2.618   2.186 
    (4.394)   (3.833) 
Delisting X MTB 
     4.251*  4.028+ 
     (2.064)  (2.196) 
Delisting X Surviving years 
      1.260* 1.041* 
      (0.635) (0.463) 
           
E
st
im
a
ti
o
n
 
st
a
ti
st
ic
s 
Observations 1,587 1,587 1,587 1,587 1,587 1,587 1,587 
Number of companies 370 370 370 370 370 370 370 
Number of instruments 130 138 141 141 141 139 141 
Hansen J statistic 89.55 93.97 93.11 88.10 93.84 92.06 83.82 
p-value of Hansen statistic 0.523 0.597 0.674 0.797 0.654 0.650 0.827 
ar(1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ar(2) 0.0881 0.219 0.145 0.176 0.121 0.251 0.118 
Wald chi-squared statistic 4841 4773 4415 5444 4919 6012 5603 
 
aRobust standard errors (clustered at the VC level) in parentheses; two-sided tests. Year dummies included, but not 
reported. 
+ p < 0.10;  * p < 0.05;  ** p < 0.01;  *** p < 0.001 
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TABLE 3 
Arellano–Bond Dynamic Panel GMM Estimates for All VC reputation at t+1a 
  VARIABLES Non-lead VC Lead VC 
V
C
-l
ev
el
  
a
tt
ri
b
u
te
s 
Reputationt 
0.987*** 0.824*** 
(0.071) (0.061) 
Statust 
0.153 0.035 
(0.343) (0.299) 
Structural holes 
-4.483 -1.817 
(2.965) (3.342) 
Investment preference for early stage 
-1.537 2.732 
(3.083) (2.136) 
P
o
rt
fo
li
o
-l
ev
el
 a
tt
ri
b
u
te
s 
ex
cl
. 
 
fo
ca
l 
fi
rm
 a
tt
ri
b
u
te
s 
Company age 
-0.868 -1.118 
(0.553) (0.772) 
Revenue 
-0.306 -0.495 
(0.259) (0.477) 
ROA (Industry-adjusted net income/assets) 
0.225 -3.737* 
(1.490) (1.649) 
MTB 
0.499* 0.390 
(0.198) (0.310) 
VC ownership 
0.066 -0.220+ 
(0.080) (0.118) 
Other delisting events in the portfolio firms 
-0.376 -0.722+ 
(0.229) (0.380) 
F
o
ca
l 
fi
rm
 a
tt
ri
b
u
te
s 
Company age 
-5.169*** -3.722 
(1.570) (2.535) 
Revenue 
0.037 0.384 
(0.289) (0.553) 
ROA (Industry-adjusted net income/assets) 
-0.591 0.336 
(1.734) (1.027) 
MTB 
0.199 -0.608 
(0.576) (0.614) 
VC ownership 
0.052 -0.074+ 
(0.116) (0.043) 
Surviving years 
0.521** 0.159 
(0.199) (0.349) 
Delisting 
3.135 -6.093* 
(2.367) (2.393) 
      
E
st
im
a
ti
o
n
 s
ta
ti
st
ic
s Observations 3,989 1,587 
Number of companies 943 370 
Number of instruments 105 138 
Hansen J statistic 65.26 93.97 
p-value of Hansen statistic 0.468 0.597 
ar(1) 0 0 
ar(2) 0.681 0.219 
Wald chi-squared statistic 3518 4773 
aRobust standard errors (clustered at the VC level) in parentheses; two-sided tests. Year dummies included, but not 
reported;  + p < 0.10;  * p < 0.05;  ** p < 0.01;  *** p < 0.001 
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FIGURE 1 
Effect of Delisting and Market-to-Book (MTB) Ratio 
 
 
FIGURE 2 
Effect of Delisting and Surviving Years 
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